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Introduction
The sixth amendment right to counsel does not merely supplement
other constitutional rights. Counsel serves to insure the operation of pro-
cedural and constitutional protections guaranteed to a criminal defend-
ant. As the Supreme Court has stated, "There is no right more essential
than the right to assistance of counsel . .. .1 The right to counsel is a
1. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978).
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precondition of a fair trial; the active participation of defense counsel in
the entire criminal process is crucial for the functioning and fairness of
the adversary system.' If the criminal process loses its adversarial char-
acter, the constitutional guarantee is violated.3
This Article details how the severity of the underfunding of those
agencies providing defense counsel to the indigent seriously endangers
the sixth amendment guarantee to effective assistance of counsel. The
resulting threat to the integrity of the adversary system is so serious, and
the likelihood of additional funding from public sources so dim, that the
legal profession itself must act to provide supplemental revenues for the
defense of the indigent accused.
I. Establishment of the Indigent Defendant's Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel
A. The Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court first acted in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama4 to
redress the injustices confronting indigent defendants. In Powell, the
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution required the appointment of counsel for an indigent
on trial for a capital offense. In establishing the importance of the de-
fense counsel to our adversary system of jilstice, the Court observed:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapa-
ble, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence ir-
relevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate,
2. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S.
361, 364 (1981). See also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (vigorous advocacy
by both the defense counsel and the prosecutor is needed to promote the ultimate objective
that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
318 (1981) (the system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public
interests in truth and fairness); Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Fact-Finding Precision,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1091 (1975).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984).
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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or those of feeble intellect.'
Six years later, the Court broadened Powell by holding that all indi-
gents charged with any felony in a federal proceeding had a sixth amend-
ment right to counsel.6 Then, in Gideon v. Wainwright,7 the Court held
that the sixth amendment right to counsel for felony trials was applicable
to the states as well, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' In a trilogy of decisions that same year, the Supreme
Court encouraged the use by state prisoners of federal habeas corpus pe-
titions and collateral-type attacks on convictions.9 In 1972, in
Argersinger v. Hamlin,1 ° the Court further expanded the right to counsel
when it held that no defendant could be incarcerated, even for a misde-
meanor conviction, unless he had been provided counsel to assist in his
defense. "
Hence, in the decade from Gideon to Argersinger, substantial new
burdens were placed upon the criminal justice system. Justice Powell in
his concurring opinion in Argersinger realized that the "decision could
have a seriously adverse impact upon the day-to-day functioning of the
criminal justice system."12 Former Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion, however, expressed confidence that the legal profession could
meet the challenge: "The holding of the Court today may very well add
large new burdens to a profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of
5. Id. at 69.
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In deciding Gideon the Court overturned Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942). In Brady, the Court held that the right to counsel did not extend to all felony
cases, but rather only to cases in which the denial of counsel would be "shocking to the univer-
sal sense of justice . . . ." Id. at 462.
8. For a discussion of the impact of the Gideon Court's reliance on the Sixth Amend-
ment, upon the increase in the number of appeals of state convictions, see Scott v. United
States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
9. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). The holding inFay v. Noia ensured the active involvement of
the federal courts in the Protection of constitutional rights. The court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, declared that "federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied
without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review." 372 U.S. at 424. See Com-
ment, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Hindsight View of Trial Attorney Effectiveness, 27 LA. L.
REV. 784 (1967) (after Gideon, the federal courts were flooded with habeas corpus petitions
from state prisoners).
10. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
11. Id. at 37.
12. 407 U.S. 25, 52 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, in a concurring opin-
ion joined by Justice Rehnquist, predicted that "backlogs", "bottle-necks", and "chaos" would
result in the state courts. Id. at 55-56.
the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it."'1 3 As we
shall see, the years following Argersinger have revealed that the Chief
Justice's confidence was misplaced.
B. The Right to "Effective" Counsel
The defendant's right to challenge the quality of the legal assistance
provided to him did not immediately follow the right to counsel granted
in Powell.4 The Court in Powell had indicated that when there was an
obligation to provide legal counsel to an indigent, "that duty is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to
preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the
case.,"' 5 Some courts nevertheless narrowly interpreted the holding so
as to undercut the right to "effective" counsel. In Mitchell v. United
States,'6 for example, the court held that an "effective appointment" by
the court was required but that "effective appointment" did not refer to
the quality of service that counsel has rendered.' 7 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Diggs v. Welch,'" stated: "It is clear that once com-
petent counsel is appointed his subsequent negligence does not deprive
the accused of any right under the Sixth Amendment. All that amend-
ment requires is that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel."' 19
However, by 1964, the right to effective assistance in the qualitative sense
was firmly imbedded in case law.20 In 1970, the Supreme Court, in Mc-
Mann v. Richardson,2 clearly stated that "defendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel."22
13. Id. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Brennan, in a separate concurring opin-
ion, encouraged law students to assist in the increased representational needs of the indigent
defendant. Id. at 40-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
14. There was no ancestor to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in English law.
For a discussion of the response of English law to a defendant's claim against his trial counsel,
see Rondel v. Worsley, I A.C. 191 (1969). American courts, following English tradition, had
held that a lawyer's negligence and lack of skill would not lead to a reversal of conviction. See
State v. Dreher, 137 Mo. 11, 23, 38 S.W. 567, 570 (1897) ("The decisions [of the American
Courts] are too numerous to cite, but their uniform tenor is to the effect that neither ignorance,
blunders, nor misapprehension of counsel not occasioned by his adversary is ground for setting
aside a judgment or awarding a new trial.").
15. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
16. 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
17. Id. at 790.
18. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
19. Id. at 668.
20. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Convic-
tion Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289-92 (1964).
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
22. Id. at 771 (emphasis added). The Court added that, "If the right to counsel guaran-
teed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose ... judges should strive to maintain proper
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II. The Remedy of an Appeal Based on Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
A. The Growing Number of Appeals
Gideon's mandate to the states to provide counsel to all indigents
charged with felonies led to a rapid increase in the number of attorneys
representing clients in criminal cases.23 Since many of the attorneys do-
ing this defense work had no prior criminal experience, claims of inade-
quate representation of counsel sharply increased.24
The Supreme Court has expanded and specified the various stages of
prosecution for which the defendant has the constitutional right to coun-
sel. The Court has extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to
include effective assistance during all critical stages of the proceedings
against him, including: the process of custodial interrogation;25 a lineup
or other pre-trial identification proceeding;26 a probation revocation
hearing;27 a preliminary hearing;28 and a parole revocation hearing.29 In
re Gault30 extended the right of counsel to juvenile cases, and although
Douglas v. California31 guaranteed the right to counsel during the first
appeal of a conviction, it was not until 1985, in Evitts v. Lucey,32 that the
Court held there was a guarantee of effective assistance of counsel on that
same appeal. The additional burdens and duties imposed on counsel led
to an increase in ineffective assistance claims.
The increasing complexity of defense work has been another factor
leading to a growing number of ineffective assistance claims.33 As a corn-
standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in
their courts." Id.
23. See BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN LAW AND
ACTION 147, 166-67 (S. Nagle ed. 1972); see also Johnson v. City Comm'n of Aberdeen, 272
N.W.2d 97, 100 (S.D. 1978) (appointments of counsel increased five-fold in the nine years
between the Gideon and Argersinger decisions).
24. See Strazella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19
ARIZ. L. REv. 443, 445 (1977).
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
27. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
28. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
29. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
30. 287 U.S. 1 (1967).
31. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
32. 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that the right to
an effective lawyer is one of the procedural protections that must be given to a defendant if the
state permits a defendant to appeal his conviction. Id. at 836.
33. A survey of the number of claims of incompetent counsel, comparing reported opin-
ions in the federal circuit courts of appeals in the years 1963-1965, with the years 1969-1971,
revealed a 262% increase in ineffective assistance claims. Strazella, supra note 24, at 445 n.8.
petent attorney has more to do, there is greater risk of default. In this
regard, the court in State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley34 observed:
Today, the defense lawyer in a criminal case is confronted with a
myriad of fine points in which he must deal. The modem criminal
lawyer must engage in complicated and detailed pretrial discovery,
analysis of involved issues of search and seizure, occasional scien-
tific jury selection, elaborate rules relating to conspiracy, and in
addition he must be conversant with the forensic sciences,
medicine, psychiatry and other disciplines unrelated to the practice
of law. Not only is the lawyer currently required to deal with these
convoluted and diverse legal and non-legal matters but the pros-
pects for additional intricacies in the future are almost
inescapable."
The responsibilities of counsel also include the duty to: (1) compe-
tently and fully advise the client during plea negotiations;36 (2) explore
all legally justifiable motions, including those for a reduction in bail;37
and (3) examine any possible psychiatric defenses and insure that the
defendant is mentally competent to proceed with the case.38 An attor-
ney must not only inform his client of the right to take a direct appeal,39
but is obligated to explain that the defendant, if he is unable to afford
counsel, will be provided with state-appointed counsel for that appeal."
In addition to a direct appeal claiming ineffectiveness of counsel,
convicted defendants, after exhausting their appeals in state court, can
petition a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus to collaterally
attack the conviction. Such an action would typically allege that the con-
viction was obtained without due process of law because the attorney did
not provide effective assistance of counsel, and the defendant was thereby
deprived of his constitutional rights.41
34. 227 S.E.2d 314 (W.Va. 1976).
35. Id. at 322.
36. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); Fitzgerald v. Beto, 479 F.2d
420 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th
Cir. 1975).
37. State v. Watson, 134 Ariz. 1, 653 P.2d 351 (1982).
38. United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 2254 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. McDonnell, 91
Mich. App. 458, 283 N.W.2d 773 (1979).
39. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Cardwell, 432 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1970).
40. United States ex reL Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1969).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) requires a federal court to presume the validity of the state
court's factual findings, but the issue of whether the lawyer's conduct violated the defendant's
constitutional rights is a mixed determination of law and fact requiring the application of legal
principles to the facts of the case. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980). See also
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6, 318 (1963) (the factual determinations made by state
courts which the federal courts must presume to be correct, do not include mixed questions of
fact and law). The district court considering the writ can hold an evidentiary hearing examin-
ing not only the trial record, but other evidence as well. Some state courts have therefore
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B. Obstacles to Proving a Claim of Ineffective Assistance
There are, however, obstacles to proving a claim of ineffective assist-
ance. An analysis of approximately 4,000 federal and state reported ap-
pellate decisions regarding claims of ineffective assistance between 1970
and 1983 showed that only 3.9% resulted in a finding of ineffective coun-
sel.42 First, although the defendant might like to invoke the attorney-
client privilege to prevent his trial attorney from explaining why, for ex-
ample, he did not attempt to contact alleged alibi witnesses, courts rou-
tinely hold that once a defendant has commenced his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, he has waived the attorney-client privilege.43
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility,' the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,45 and the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice46 all permit the attorney, when the quality of his repre-
sentation is being attacked by his former client, to reveal matters which
may have been told him in confidence. The trial attorney who is most
frequently a government witness and conscious of how any testimony
admitting ineffective representation might affect a malpractice action or
disciplinary hearing, may, therefore, become an adversary, trying to de-
feat his former client's claim on appeal.47
deferred to the habeas proceeding because the district court is not bound to limit itself to a
mere review of the trial record. See People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 428, 590 P.2d 859, 868-69,
152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 741-42 (1979). Other courts have viewed the collateral attack as "placing
the very integrity of a state's criminal proceeding in question." Langley v. State, 256 Ind. 199,
204, 267 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (1971). For an analysis of recent proposals to restrict a defend-
ant's access to habeas corpus review of state convictions, see Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-A
Need for Reform, 73 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1036 (1982); see also, Torbert, Overly-
Broad Application of Federal Habeas Corpus, 43 ALA. L. REV. 22 (1982); Peller, In Defense of
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982). When the trial record
clearly contains sufficient information on which to assess the claim of ineffective assistance, it
may be preferable to litigate the claim on direct appeal. See Brody & Albert, Ineffective Repre-
sentation as a Basisfor Relieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. I.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 1, 87 (1977); Strazella, supra note 24, at 460; Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 939-
40 n.66 (1973).
42. Brief of Amici Curiae, National Legal Aid and Defender Association [NLADA], The
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and the American Civil Liberties Union, at 22, in
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). The research was funded by the American Bar
Association, Bar Information Program of the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants, and conducted by NLADA. Id. at 19.
43. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 12, 539 P.2d 556, 564 (1975).
44. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(4) (1981).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983).
46. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-8.6(c) (1980 & Supp. 1986).
47. The dilemma of the attorney in a hearing to assess his own ineffectiveness of counsel
was noted by the Ninth Circuit in Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966). The
court described the attorney as being "in the unenviable position where, if he can recall his
reasons and they are good, he is hurting his former client, and if he can recall his reasons and
[Vol. 13:625
Summer 1986] ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 633
Some courts had taken the position that there must be the state act
of appointment of counsel in order to create a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Consequently,
these courts would not reverse on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel when counsel had been retained by the defendant himself.48 The
courts reasoned that retained counsel was the defendant's agent rather
than the agent of the state, and that the defendant, therefore, was bound
by his attorney's acts and omissions. The adamant attitude of these
courts is reflected in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' denial of a
claim of ineffective assistance:
The most that can be said for this testimony is that it establishes
that appellee's counsel drank throughout the trial and that he was
under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a greater or lesser de-
gree during the whole trial. But what of it? Appellee employed
him; he paid him a substantial fee, and had a right to his services if
he desired them, even though he might have been under the influ-
ence of intoxicants.49
In 1980, however, the Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan5" made it
clear that the right to effective counsel applies to all defendants, and not
just to those with counsel appointed by the court.51
The general reluctance of state appellate courts to reverse convic-
tions on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel presents an obstacle
to defendants making such a claim. Former Chief Judge Bazelon noted
that: "One of the major reasons that the problem of ineffective assistance
has remained hidden is the appellate courts' remarkable propensity to
ignore the issue of ineffective assistance altogether and to paper over the
cracks in the house that Gideon built.""2 The primary reason appellate
they are bad, or even not very good, he is impugning his own professional competence." Id. at
27.
48. See, e.g., Hendricksen v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ind. 1955); Rice v. Davis,
366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Fryson, 36 Misc.2d 73, 232 N.Y.S.2d 224
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
49. Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962, 967 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617
(1941). See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426 (3d Cir.) (en banc)
(Maris, J., concurring), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953) ("When counsel is retained by a
defendant to represent him in a criminal case he acts in no sense as an officer of the state."); see
also United States v. Butler, 167 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 574 (4th Cir.
1958) (no reversal where the lawyer was addicted to narcotics use during the trial); People v.
Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 19 Cal. App. 3d
102, 96 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1971) (no reversal where the lawyer was actually physically ill during
the conduct of the trial).
50. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
51. Id. at 344-45.
52. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Bazelon, Defective Assistance]. Judge Bazelon has written of his own court: "I have
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courts give for denying ineffective assistance claims is that the court does
not wish to second-guess a lawyer's decisions concerning proper trial
strategy or tactics.53 Court decisions specifically warn against the dan-
gers in using hindsight to review counsel's conduct.5 4 As the court in
Rodriguez v. State55 observed, courts are slow to express a negative opin-
ion as to "whether a licensed member of the bar, authorized to practice
law in this state, is competent to do so, or has adequately represented and
protected the rights of a client... .,56 As a result, courts have not found
ineffective assistance in cases where the defense counsel has failed to pro-
duce for trial a material witness for the defendant,57 has failed to raise
certain appropriate defenses to rebut the prosecution's case,58 or has
made errors in judgment in the process of representing the defendant. 59
It is, however, highly questionable whether a defendant who was
convicted as a result of his lawyer's poor judgment ought not be able to
have that conviction overturned or at least carefully examined. Yet, la-
belling a lawyer's performance errors as mistakes in "strategy" or "tac-
tics" deems those errors to be, by definition, unreviewable. Lawyers are
hired and assigned not exclusively for their technical expertise, but also
for their ability to exercise sound professional judgment and to know
when and how to apply their skills. A prime component of competent
representation is the proper exercise of the "judgment call", and courts
ignoring prejudicial, improper omissions or actions because they are
deemed to fall under that characterization do a gross disservice to the
unfortunate client.
Courts, in expressing their reluctance to reverse convictions, have
shown concern that were an appeal to be granted on the grounds that
counsel was ineffective, members of the bar would be discouraged from
often been told that if my court were to reverse every case in which there was inadequate
counsel, we would have to send back half of the convictions in my jurisdiction." Id. at 22-23.
53. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 560 P.2d 921 (Nev. 1977); People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. App.
3d 255, 359 N.E.2d 791 (1977). For a Circuit Court of Appeals decision giving the same
rationale, see United States v. Housewright, 568 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1977). But see Pineda v.
Craven, 424 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1970) (the Ninth Circuit's response to a lawyer's claim
that his conduct did not constitute ineffective assistance, but rather was a tactical choice, was
that "[tihere is nothing strategic or tactical about ignorance .... ").
54. See, e.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Robinson, 502 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1974).
55. 170 Tex. Crim. 295, 340 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
56. Id. at 296, 340 S.W.2d at 62.
57. Hoffier v. Peyton, 207 Va. 302, 311, 149 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1966) (the court termed
such failure "merely an error of judgment which does not constitute lack of effective represen-
tation of counsel"). See also Abbot v. Peyton, 329 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Va. 1971).
58. State v. Eby, 342 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
59. People v. Carter, 41 Ill. App. 3d 425, 354 N.E.2d 482 (1976).
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taking on the defense of criminal defendants.6" Other reasons given by
courts for hesitating to find ineffective assistance include: (1) a fear that
defendants' successes would lead to an increase in cases for the already
overburdened appellate courts;61  (2) the policy of "finality" of judg-
ment, 62 which finds additional support at present by politicians' calls for
swift and certain punishment for those convicted of crimes;63 and (3) a
fear that reversing convictions based on ineffective assistance could have
an adverse effect on prison discipline.'
To compound the obstacles facing the defendant, appellate courts
must rely on the official record of the proceeding and, unlike the federal
district court reviewing a habeas petition, they cannot usually conduct an
evidentiary hearing to enable the defendant to more clearly explain the
failings of counsel. The trial record on which an appeals court must rely
may well have been insufficiently developed by the same attorney whom
the defendant claims has been an ineffective representative. 5
Moreover, a certain cynicism on the part of the courts to the claim
of a convicted defendant is not uncommon,66 and can be noted in the
following decision:
Convicts are not subject to the deterrents of prosecution for per-
jury and contempt of court which affect ordinary litigants. The
opportunity to try his former lawyer has its undoubted attraction
60. See Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704-06 (5th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. United States,
259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1959) (there can be no inquiry into
the quality of services given, or else lawyers would not accept assignments to represent indi-
gent defendants); Norman v. United States, 100 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 660
(1939).
61. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d at 793.
62. See Bines, supra note 41, at 929. The Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), observed that: "[Tihe presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest
in collateral attacks on that judgment." Id. at 697.
63. Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949).
64. Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court explained in a decision denying a
defendant's appeal:
In view of the silence of the record on the reasons why no mental defense was
presented, appellant's claim would be more appropriately made in a petition for
habeas corpus. Indeed, if presented in a verified petition, appellant's allegation con-
cerning the substantial mental defenses which were not offered would undoubtedly
present a colorable claim entitling appellant to an evidentiary hearing. At such a
hearing, appellant would be able to produce evidence on matters merely alleged
before this court.
People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 428, 590 P.2d 859, 868-69, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 741-42 (1979).
See also People v. Piper, 103 Cal. App. 3d 102, 162 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1980).
65. See Waltz, supra note 20, at 290.
66. See, e.g., Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338, 342-44, 238 S.W. 737, 739 (1922),
where the court declared that a defendant may not sit idly by while his counsel presents false
defenses and then, after a guilty verdict, throw himself upon the mercy of the court because of
his counsel's lack of skill.
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to a disappointed prisoner.... He may realize that his allegations
will not be believed but the relief from monotony offered by a hear-
ing in court is well worth the trouble of writing them down. To
allow a prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel
... is to give every convict the privilege of opening a Pandora's box
of accusations which trial courts near penal institutions would be
compelled to hear.67
Chief Judge Bazelon described the attitude of the appellate courts as fol-
lows: "It is the belief-rarely articulated, but I am afraid, widely held-
that most criminal defendants are guilty anyway. From this assumption
it is a short path to the conclusion that the quality of representation is of
small account."6 8
To a certain extent, the collegiality of the legal profession-most
judges were once practicing attorneys themselves-also inhibits courts
from taking action which may be viewed as a condemnation of an attor-
ney's performance, 69 or of the trial judge's supervision.7" Courts, for ex-
ample, have attempted to preserve the reputation of an attorney by not
using the attorney's name when finding ineffective assistance.71 Finger v.
State72 exemplifies how unacceptable it may seem to a lawyer to be per-
ceived of as criticizing another lawyer. In Finger, the lawyer, represent-
ing a defendant on an appeal based in part on the claim of ineffective
assistance, made a motion to the Indiana Supreme Court for a rehearing.
The motion was based on counsel's being "critical" of the earlier
Supreme Court decision for "having identified him as the appellate coun-
sel" who had alleged that the trial attorney had been ineffective, and fur-
ther charged the court with "judicial indiscretion" in identifying the trial
counsel by name.73
There is little likelihood that an attorney who represented a defend-
ant at trial will raise the issue of ineffectiveness when representing that
67. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
68. Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 52, at 26.
69. See State v. Dreher, 38 S.W. 567, 571 (Mo. 1897) (labeling of a lawyer's work as
ineffective is a condemnation of his professional status without a hearing). Claims of ineffec-
tive assistance may be viewed as an attack on the profession itself, and the judicial members of
the profession may hesitate to act in ways critical of other members.
70. See McGee, Defense ofIndigents: Current Status, 29 ALA. LAW 408, 425-26 (1968)
(to uphold the claim of ineffectiveness condemns not only the defense attorney but also would
in some instances "censure the trial judge, and even the prosecutor, for failure to do justice.").
71. See, e.g., United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964)
(referring in its opinion to the attorney as "Mr. Z."). But see United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d
928, 931 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970) (Judge Friendly expressed his.gratitude to the appellate counsel
"for his vigorous undertaking of the distasteful task of criticizing a brother lawyer on Katz'
behalf.").
72. 260 Ind. 524, 297 N.E.2d 819 (1973).
73. Id. at 525, 297 N.E.2d at 820.
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
same defendant on appeal. Yet, even when the appellate lawyer works in
a different division of the same office as the trial attorney, as is the case in
many large, urban legal aid and public defender offices, that association
may well hinder the new attorney's diligent pursuit of an appeal on
grounds of ineffective assistance. It is difficult for an appellate attorney
to maintain that the same office which employs him failed to provide
constitutionally satisfactory representation at the trial level, and it is
awkward and discomforting to ask the assigning judge to relieve him on
those grounds.74 However reluctant the lawyer may be, the ethical obli-
gation of the appellate lawyer to pursue a warranted appeal on ineffective
assistance grounds is clear.75
Another major problem prevents defendants from obtaining relief
when they have had ineffective counsel. Appellate counsel generally
have the same heavy caseload as trial attorneys, and consequently, a
thorough, well-prepared, adequate appeal is often not achieved. 76 In ad-
74. For an analysis of the ethical duty of an appellate lawyer who perceives a valid ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim against a trial lawyer who works in the same office, see Web-
ster, The Public Defender, The Sixth Amendment, and the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The Resolution of a Conflict of Interest, 12 CRIM. L. REV. 739 (1975).
75. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 46, are unequivocal. Standard 4-
8.6(a) states: "If a lawyer, after investigation, is satisfied that another lawyer who served in an
earlier phase of the case did not provide effective assistance, he or she should not hesitate to
seek relief for the defendant on that ground." The Commentary elaborates on the import of
the responsibility:
Nothing would be more destructive of the goals of effective assistance of counsel and
justice than to immunize the misconduct of a lawyer by the unwillingness of other
lawyers to expose the inadequacy. Lawyers must be especially careful to avoid per-
mitting their personal regard for a fellow lawyer to blind them to that lawyer's failure
to provide the effective assistance to which every defendant is entitled as a matter of
constitutional right.
Id. Additionally, Canon 7 and Ethical Considerations 7-4 and 7-9 of the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, supra note 44, have been cited for the proposition that "it [is] coun-
sel's solemn duty ... to present the issue of trial counsel's competence" to the appellate court.
Finger v. State, 260 Ind. 524, 525, 297 N.E.2d 819, 820 (1973).
76. An examination of the quality of appellate advocacy in the Circuit Courts of Appeal
found that the factor believed by judges to be the most frequent cause of inadequacy was the
"failure by lawyers to research their cases and prepare themselves to the best of their ability."
A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 8
(1978) [hereinafter cited as PARTRIDGE & BERMANT]. A study by the National Defender
Institute, NATIONAL DEFENDER INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF FOUR COUNTY PUBLIC DE-
FENDER PROJECTS FOR THE EIGHT B JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IOWA (1979), reported in LEF-
STEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR-METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR
PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING, ABA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS Appendix F-18 (May
1984), found that "appellate cases are assigned to defenders who already have a full trial load."
See also CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT OF ABT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN MARION COUNTY, INDIANA (1980), reported in LEF-
STEIN, at Appendix F-16 (the assessment found that the quality of representation, especially in
appellate cases, was unsatisfactory); NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT,
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dition, underfinancing and understaffing of appeals units in defender of-
fices create such delays in processing appeals that prisoners may have
served their sentences before their appeals are even heard."
III. What Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Interference by the Trial Court
Reversals of convictions have frequently occurred upon a finding
that the trial court itself had been responsible for inhibiting counsel's
representation. Defendants' claims, for example, have succeeded when
the court refused to allow the lawyer to give a summation at a bench
trial;78 prohibited the lawyer from consulting with his client during the
overnight recess; 79 required the defendant to testify first, before other de-
fense witnesses, or not at all;8 ° denied the defendant counsel at arraign-
ment;81 prevented the lawyer from consulting with the defendant before
cross examination began;82 and forced counsel to trial with such speed as
to preclude effective assistance.83 In these cases, the denial of due pro-
cess under the Fourteenth Amendment is paramount, and the defendant
is not required to show that the outcome of the trial was affected by the
trial court's improper action.
B. Failure of Counsel to Exercise the Skill of a Reasonably
Competent Attorney
Ineffective assistance also occurs when a lawyer has failed to exer-
cise the skill of a reasonably competent attorney so that the defendant
was denied his sixth amendment right. The courts have found ineffective
representation where the lawyer failed to put forth a valid, viable de-
fense;84 request an appropriate charge to the jury which was favorable to
EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE PUBLIC DEFENDERS (1979), reported in LEFSTEIN,
at Appendix F-6 ("In appellate cases involving private assigned counsel, low compensation
contributes to ineffective representation.").
77. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL ADVOCACY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT APPEALS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND
DEPARTMENTS (April 1985) (briefs are not filed until almost eight months after lawyers re-
ceive the transcript, and the result of the delay is to effectively deny indigents their right of
appeal); Gaines v. Manson, 195 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984) (insufficient staffing of the
public defender office in processing appeals caused delays of two to four-and-a-half years).
78. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
79. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
80. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
81. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
82. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
83. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945).
84. United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970); Young v. Zant,
677 F.2d 792 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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the defense; 5 properly investigate contradictory statements made by the
prosecution's witnesses and to call witnesses which could have raised
doubts regarding the occurrence of the crime; 6 file necessary motions to
suppress illegally seized evidence; 7 effectively participate in the selection
of a jury;"8 adequately cross-examine witnesses;s'avoid eliciting informa-
tion on cross-examination that was damaging to his client's case, even
after having been cautioned by the trial judge;90 and be sufficiently in-
volved in the trial proceedings. 91
Reversals on ineffective assistance grounds have also resulted from a
trial lawyer's lack of awareness of applicable statutes and provisions of
the law. In People v. Ibarra,92 for example, the court found that the trial
was reduced to a farce because the lawyer was unaware that the defend-
ant could have challenged the legality of a search while simultaneously
denying any proprietary interest in the entered premises. In Roberts v.
United States,93 the court reversed the conviction when the lawyer was
misinformed about the existence of a requirement of a mandatory special
parole term upon the defendant's entry of a plea. Other examples in-
clude In re Williams,94 in which the lawyer had advised his client to
plead guilty to a forgery charge when, in fact, the only charge proper for
prosecution was the lesser charge of misuse of credit cards, and Wilson v.
Reagan,9" in which the lawyer, unaware that the court had the authority
to impose a sentence of probation instead of jail, had failed to request the
probationary sentence for his client.
IV. Recent Decisions Limiting Claims Based on Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
In three recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has seri-
ously undermined the remedy available to a defendant receiving ineffec-
tive representation.
85. Taylor v. Starnes, 650 F.2d 38, 41 (4th Cir. 1981); Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d
202 (8th Cir. 1982).
86. Garza v. Wolff, 528 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1975).
87. Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663
(8th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
88. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977).
89. United States v. Clayborne, 590 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
90. People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).
91. United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
92. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
93. 491 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1974).
94. 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969).
95. 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965).
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A. Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland v. Washington,96 the Court held that even if counsel's
performance was deficient and the errors made were so serious that coun-
sel was not functioning as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a convic-
tion should not be reversed unless the defendant shows "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."'' 7 The Court set
forth a two-prong test that must be met before a conviction will be over-
turned based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must
show: (1) deficient performance by the trial attorney; and (2) that. the
deficient performance resulted in sufficient prejudice to the defendant.
The Court, in discussing the first prong of the required two-prong
test, sent a clear message to lower courts that there is a strong presump-
tion that counsel's conduct was constitutionally adequate. 98 The Court
asserted:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferen-
tial. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy
for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuc-
cessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hind-
sight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged con-
duct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time.... [T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be consid-
ered sound trial strategy."9 9
Courts do not follow a "highly deferential" standard of review when
evaluating the work of other professions." ° Nor is there any "strong
presumption"101 that the professional acted reasonably.102 The standard
is "reasonable professional competence" for malpractice suits against
96. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
97. Id. at 694.
98. Id. at 690-91.
99. Id. at 689 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
100. It is perhaps somewhat ironic that lawyers who so actively litigate and accuse other
professionals (especially doctors) of failing to perform appropriately, are themselves afforded
such a presumption of competence.
101. The Strickland Court noted that in evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." 466 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
102. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, noted that "by 'strongly presuming' that [the defense
attorney's] behavior will fall within the zone of reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate convic-
tions and sentences obtained on the basis of incompetent conduct by defense counsel." Id. at
713 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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physicians and surgeons, 10 3 accountants," ° and architects.10 5 Certainly
the harm and loss of liberty resulting to a defendant because of an incom-
petent attorney may be far greater than the damage done to a client of a
negligent accountant or architect.
The federal courts promptly adopted the new standards of review
set out in Strickland. The Fifth Circuit, in Ricalday v. Procunier, 1
0 6
ruled that the standards were immediately applicable even though Strick-
land had not been decided at the time the defendant's counsel repre-
sented him at trial, or when the direct appeal was heard, or when the
district court ruled on the habeas petition. The Fifth Circuit proceeded
to hold that even though counsel's error was an egregious one which was
not within the wide range of professionally competent assistance, the
conviction ought not be overturned because the defendant failed to show
a reasonable probability that the factfinder would have acquitted the de-
fendant had the attorney not been deficient in his representation of his
client.1
0 7
For a court to be required to engage in speculation about how the
trial might have gone if counsel had been an effective advocate is to mini-
mize the importance of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and the
adversary system itself will suffer.10' The absence of effective representa-
tion may well have had an effect on the entire proceeding that was so
pervasive that it is not possible to accurately determine the degree of
prejudice. How can an appellate court determine, for example, what in-
formation a well-carried out investigation would have yielded,' 019 or how
effective an insanity defense could have been if counsel would have had a
103. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
104. O'Neill v. Atlas Automobile Finance Corp., 139 Pa. 346, 11 A.2d 782 (1940).
105. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordini Construction Co., Inc., 401 Pa. 358, 164 A.2d 201
(1960).
106. 736 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 209.
108. In McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218-19 (8th Cir. 1974), the court noted that
inadequate representation is "not the product of an adversary, but a flaw in the adversary
process."
109. In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court, in discussing the adequacy of the represen-
tation provided by the defense attorneys appointed to represent the defendant, noted: "It is
not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case thought there was no de-
fense, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither
they nor the Court could say what a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to
the facts." 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Tucker, 716
F.2d 576, 593 (9th Cir. 1983) (when investigation and preparation of the case by counsel is
inadequate, it follows that the record is necessarily incomplete as to the extent of prejudice
which resulted from the attorney's failings); cf. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 100-01
(1955); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 (1945).
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psychiatrist examine his client?1 '
In addition, juries evaluate many subjective, as well as objective, fac-
tors that bear on determining witness-credibility, and may well have been
influenced in ways that a court reviewing the cold, written record could
not determine. An effective attorney, having properly investigated the
case, may have been able to cross-examine the crucial prosecution wit-
ness in a manner that would have impacted on the witness' credibility
and demeanor in ways the reviewing court could never ascertain. The
ineffectiveness of counsel, for example, in not investigating, seeking out,
and interviewing possible defense witnesses, may well be the very reason
that the record will not reflect prejudice for review."'
And what can be the response to the defendant who was denied
relief even though his counsel was found to be clearly ineffective? The
Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice noted that "[f]air treatment of every individual-fair in fact
and also perceived to be fair by those affected-is an essential element of
justice and a principal objective of the American criminal justice
system."'l
2
The most ominous portion of the Strickland decision, however, indi-
cates the Court's apparent desire to inhibit careful judicial review and to
discourage courts from granting relief based on claims of ineffective rep-
resentation of counsel:
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney per-
formance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would en-
courage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal
trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's unsuc-
cessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to
110. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the state
must provide a psychiatric expert for a defendant unable to afford one if a preliminary showing
has been made that the defendant's sanity is likely to be a significant factor at the trial.
111. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Court seemed fully aware of the
dangers involved in relying upon the record to show prejudice. In rejecting the government's
argument that the defendant need show prejudice when represented by an attorney also repre-
senting the co-defendant, the Court stated:
[T]he evil-it bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to
refrain from doing; not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations
and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the
record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial
tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult
to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a
client.
Id. at 490-91 (emphasis added).
112. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY viii (1967) (emphasis added).
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serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and
rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ar-
dor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage
the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between
attorney and client."'
Does the Court here admit that representation by counsel is fre-
quently ineffective and could not withstand close scrutiny? Or does the
Court somehow assume that any proliferation of cases would present
claims without merit, even though there seems to be a number of counsel
so deluged with cases that they are simply unable to provide effective
assistance?" 4 Former Chief Justice Burger, while joining the majority in
Strickland, has frequently lectured and written about his concern for the
lack of competence and the poor quality of representation provided by
trial attorneys. 115 The former Chief Justice is by no means alone; other
high-ranking judges have sharply criticized attorneys' low level of com-
petency.1 6  But for whatever reason the Court feared a proliferation of
113. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). The Court, bringing the message home
once more, cautioned that "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any
given case" and "it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable." Id.
at 689.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 174-265. Perhaps the main reason for any
"proliferation of challenges" is the proliferation of instances in which counsel was not able to
provide effective representation.
115. See, e.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
cation of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973),
where the Chief Justice noted that "it is the observation of judges that the Criminal Justice Act
has not brought about improvement in the general quality of criminal defense and that per-
formance has not been generally adequate--either by assigned private counsel or by the public
defender office." Id. at 237. The results of a questionnaire sent out by the Federal Judicial
Center in 1977 to all 476 federal district judges lends support to Chief Justice Burger's com-
ments. In answer to the question, "Do you believe there is, overall, a serious problem of
inadequate trial advocacy by lawyers with cases in your court?", 41% of the 366 respondents
replied, "Yes." PARTRIDGE & BERMANT, supra note 76, at 30-43. The most frequent conse-
quence of this inadequacy, cited by more than half the respondents, was a failure to fully
protect the client's interests. Id. at 16. Moreover, 33% ofjudges surveyed reported a "serious
problem" of inadequate advocacy by appointed criminal defense counsel in federal court. Id.;
see also, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMIS-
SION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS TO THE 'JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1979) (concluding that there is a significant problem in the quality of trial
advocacy in the federal courts).
116. These judges include: the former Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit; the former Chief Judge Kaufman of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Judge Wilkey of the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit; Judge Schwarzer of the Northern District of California; and
Justice Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court. See Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note
52; Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Bazelon, Realities]; Kaufman, Attorney Incompetence: A Plea for Reform, 69 A.B.A. J.
308 (1983); Kaufman, Does the Judge Have the Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569
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ineffectiveness challenges, that fear alone is no reason to relax the consti-
tutional protection of the right to counsel. The Court, for example, when
deciding in Brown v. Board of Education 7 that separate educational fa-
cilities were inherently unequal, was not deterred by the concern that
such a finding would result in a proliferation of new court cases challeng-
ing separate but equal public facilities."'
Another way in which Strickland undermines the right to effective
assistance of counsel is the Court's implication that effective assistance
may not be required when there is a very strong case against the defend-
ant: "When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." 1 9 When the prose-
cutor has a powerful case against the defendant, courts applying Strick-
land may find that, regardless of how incompetent and inadequate the
representation was, the verdict would have been the same.1 20 In these
cases, there will be no remedy for the defendant who has been convicted
without the effective assistance of counsel, because only the defendant
who can illustrate to the reviewing court that he may have otherwise
been acquitted, is awarded a remedy for ineffective assistance.'21 The
Court indicated it would not even be necessary to "grade counsel's per-
(1975); Wilkey, A Bar Examination for Federal Courts, 61 A.B.A. J. 1091 (1975); Schwarzer,
Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1980);
Erickson, Standards for Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 233 (1979).
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. The Court in the years immediately following Brown was indeed confronted with such
challenges, and proceeded to hold segregation invalid in a variety of settings. See, e.g., New
Orleans City Park Development Association v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(city golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public bathhouses and
beaches).
119. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
120. The doctrine of harmless error prohibits appellate reversals based on errors deemed
not to affect the defendant's substantial rights. The Supreme Court first extended the principle
of harmless error to constitutional concerns in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967),
where the Court noted that "there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless .. " In Chapman, the Court held that where there has
been an error at a trial that affected one's constitutional rights, the burden is on the state to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Id. at 24. Furthermore, the
Chapman Court clearly did not envision the denial of effective assistance as constituting harm-
less error. The Court, citing the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright, declared:
"[O]ur prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Id. at 23.
121. The Court certainly appears to have gone a long way toward accepting Judge
Friendly's 1970 thesis that, with certain exceptions, the only time a collateral attack on a
criminal conviction should prevail is when the petitioner has made a "colorable showing of
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formance" when the ineffectiveness claim could easily be dismissed due
to lack of sufficient prejudice.122 The reviewing court may conclude that
the defendant was clearly guilty and be able to find "no prejudice" for the
very reason that the ineffective counsel had failed to prevent the trial
record from showing overwhelming evidence of guilt. When there have
been the most egregious failings by counsel is exactly when the record
may indeed be barren of any indication of reasonable doubt. Yet, it is
those very situations where courts now need not even proceed to attempt
to discover the failings of counsel.
It might well be, moreover, that the defendant who is confronted
with a strong case against him is most in need of a diligent, competent,
and vigorous defense. The right to adequate representation ought not
hinge on the guilt or innocence of the accused. It has come to be a basic
principle of our American legal system that all have a right to counsel,
and that no one ought be deprived of liberty without a fair trial in which
there was the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland's emphasis on
the "ends" (ie., the outcome of the trial), and not the "means" (i.e., the
process that led to the conviction), may prove to be a most unfortunate
precedent. 123
innocence." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CHI. L. REv. 142-60 (1970).
122. 466 U.S. at 697.
123. State courts may not be bound by Strickland's holding if the state constitution has its
own provisions requiring effective assistance:
[Tihe decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions re-
garding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law .... Rather, state
court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by
federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned,
paying due regard to precedent and policies underlying specific constitutional guar-
antees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting
counterpart state guarantees.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
502 (1977). In fact, many states interpret their state constitutions in ways that afford greater
protection to a defendant's rights in criminal cases than those provided by the Federal Consti-
tution. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1977). Between 1970 and 1985, there have
been more than 250 cases in which state appellate courts have considered the scope of rights
guaranteed by the state constitution to be broader than the rights secured by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution. COLLINS, RELIANCE ON STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS: SOME RANDOM THOUGHTS, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
(B. McGraw ed. 1985). Justice Brennan, in an address at the 1986 annual meeting of the
American Bar Association, declared that:
[M]y own view is that this rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protec-
tions afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions-spawned in part cer-
tainly by dissatisfaction with the decisional law being announced these days by the
United States Supreme Court-is probably the most important development in con-
stitutional jurisprudence of our times.
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B. United States v. Cronic
The same day the Supreme Court decided Strickland, it decided
United States v. Cronic.124 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had re-
versed the defendant's conviction in Cronic, finding that the defendant
did not receive the effective assistance of counsel because of a combina-
tion of circumstances: the lack of sufficient time for investigation and
preparation (the lawyer was given only twenty-five days by the court to
prepare a case that took the government four-and-a-half years to investi-
gate);125 counsel's lack of experience in criminal matters (the young law-
yer had practiced real estate law and had never participated in a jury trial
prior to being appointed by the court to represent Cronic); 26 the serious-
ness of the charge;127 the complexity of available defenses (Cronic had
been indicted for thirteen counts of mail fraud involving more than
$9,400,000 in checks, and thousands of documents); 28 and the inaccessi-
bility of witnesses. The Supreme Court held that for a reversal of the
Justice William J. Brennan Jr., The Fourteenth Amendment, Address to the Section on Indi-
vidual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association 21-22 (August 8, 1986).
For an example of an attempt to have a state supreme court maintain, in light of Strick-
land, its more lenient standard for reversing on ineffective assistance counsel grounds, see Brief
of Amicus Curiae, State Appellate Defender Office, People v. Jemison, 425 Mich. 880, 389
N.W.2d 866 (1986) (advocating continued utilization of the state standard which presumed
prejudice when counsel failed to perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and
skill). The concurring opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Commonwealth v. Garvin, 335 Pa. Super. 560, 567-68, 485 A.2d 36, 40 (1984), noted that the
Strickland decision is of no force while interpreting the corresponding provision of the Penn-
sylvania constitution, and recommended that "the rule in Pennsylvania court should be that if
the defendant shows that counsel did not conduct the case in a reasonably competent manner,
relief must be granted, unless the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable doubt that counsel's
conduct had no effect on the outcome of the case."
124. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
125. Courts frequently consider the amount of time it takes the prosecution to get a case
ready for presentation to a Grand Jury and to obtain an indictment, as an indication of the
complexity of the case and the amount of time required to prepare an adequate defense. See,
e.g., United States v. Golub, 694 F.2d 207, 215 (10th Cir. 1982); Townsend v. Bormar, 351
F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1965).
126. Inexperienced counsel may well require more time to prepare a criminal case and
present it at trial than an attorney who has prepared similar cases. See Moore v. United States,
432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970); Stamps v. United States, 387 F.2d 993, 995 (8th Cir. 1967);
Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Williams v. Two-
mey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
127. Circuit Courts of Appeals repeatedly consider the seriousness of the charge as a criti-
cal factor in determining whether there has been adequate preparation time. See, e.g., Wolfs v.
Britton, 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); Townsend v.
Bowmar, 351 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1965).
128. The factual and legal complexity of the case may be equal to the seriousness of the
charge in determining the amount of time necessary to prepare an adequate defense. United
States ex rel. Spencer v. Warden, Pontiac Corr. Center., 545 F.2d 21, 23 (7th Cir. 1976).
conviction, the defendant must show specific errors committed by coun-
sel. The mere presence of factors making it unlikely that there had been
effective assistance would not suffice. 129  Taken in combination with
Strickland's prejudice requirement, state interference with counsel's abil-
ity to prepare an effective defense is generally not to be deemed sufficient
to prove inadequate representation. A defendant must show that identifi-
able, specific errors committed by counsel substantially prejudiced the
trial's result.13°
C. Morris v. Slappy
Morris v. Slappy 1" also diminishes the likelihood of a reversal based
on inadequate representation of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision wherein the Ninth Circuit
had declared that the sixth amendment right to counsel would "be with-
out substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-
client relationship." '132 In Morris, the initial public defender representing
the defendant had entered the hospital and the defendant asked for a
continuance to avoid proceeding with a substitute attorney who had been
appointed only six days before the trial was to begin. The defendant
claimed that the new counsel had insufficient time to prepare and investi-
gate, but the trial court denied the continuance request and ordered the
trial to begin after being informed by the new attorney that he was ready
to proceed. The defendant, however, maintained throughout the three-
day trial that he had no attorney representing him since his attorney was
in the hospital.'33
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant the con-
tinuance, finding, first, that there was no merit to the claim that there
was insufficient time for substituted counsel to prepare and, second, that
129. The Tenth Circuit had specifically held that the defendant was not required to show
any specific errors committed by counsel when there were present clear "circumstances
[which] hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case." United States v. Cronic,
675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982).
130. The Court in Cronic noted, however, that there continue to be circumstances of state
interference that are so likely to prejudice the accused that it is unnecessary to litigate their
specific effect in a particular case-for example, when there has been complete denial of coun-
sel, denial of representation during an initial stage of the case, or when there has been a denial
of the right to effective cross examination. 466 U.S. at 658.
131. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
132. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
133. On the third day of the trial, the defendant presented the court with a pro se petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was unrepresented by counsel. After the judge denied
the petition, the defendant told the court: "I don't have no attorney. My attorney's name is
Mr. P.D. Goldfine, Harvey Goldfine, that's my attorney, he's in the hospital." Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. at 9.
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an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified right to the counsel of
his choice.13 1 Chief Justice Burger's opinion specifically held that there
is not a sixth amendment right to a "meaningful" attorney-client rela-
tionship, reasoning that "no court could possibly guarantee that a de-
fendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney ... that the
Court of Appeals thought part of the sixth amendment guarantee of
counsel." 
135
The Court then proceeded to indicate its general distaste for the
remedy of a retrial which results from a reversal of a conviction on inef-
fective assistance grounds:
In its haste to create a novel sixth amendment right, the court [the
Ninth Circuit] wholly failed to take into account the interest of the
victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third
trial in this case .... [I]n the administration of criminal justice,
courts may not ignore the concerns of victims. Apart from all
other factors, such a course would hardly encourage victims to re-
port violations to the proper authorities .... The spectacle of re-
peated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode
inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses,
records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial
resources. 136
The Court certainly seems to be implying that at times violations of a
defendant's constitutional rights may be overlooked so as not to incon-
venience witnesses or take up court time with a retrial. 137 This implica-
tion, coupled with Strickland's "strong presumption" of competent
representation,1 3 8 may well send a message to the lower courts that there
is no mandate for vigilant protection and enforcement of the right to
effective assistance.
In Morris, the Supreme Court countenanced the trial judge's refusal
to grant the continuance requested by the indigent defendant so as not to
be forced to proceed to trial with an attorney he considered to be unpre-
pared, even though many courts have held that when a defendant pri-
vately retains counsel, a court-ordered substitution of counsel deprives
134. Id. at 11-14. The issue presented here, however, is more properly stated as whether
the trial court should have granted the defendant's request for continuous representation by
the attorney who was initially assigned to represent him..
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 14-15.
137. In a concurring opinion, Justices Blackmun and Stevens note that they find "the
Court's rather broad-ranging dicta about the right to counsel and the concerns of victims
(deserving of sympathy as they. may be) to be unnecessary in this case." Id. at 29 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
138. See supra note 101.
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the defendant of his sixth amendment right.139 The American Bar Asso-
ciation Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice
state clearly that "[c]ounsel initially provided should continue to repre-
sent the defendant throughout the trial court proceedings."'"
The Supreme Court itself, just eight years earlier, had viewed the
attorney-client relationship quite differently than in its holding in Morris:
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that
counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amend-
ment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant-not an organ of the
State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to
defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused,
against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amend-
ment .... An unwanted counsel "represents" the defendant only
through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.1
4'
The Court's condoning of the substitution of an indigent's public de-
fender days before the trial on five felony charges, and ignoring the de-
fendant's claim that there is "just no way, no possible way, that he [the
substituted lawyer] has had enough time to prepare this case,"' 42 indi-
cates that the current Supreme Court will not be a sympathetic supporter
of the indigent defendant's need to obtain a strong, effective, and produc-
tive relationship with his attorney.1
43
139. See, e.g., Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1961), where the Court of
Appeals held, in a setting similar to Morris v. Slappy, that the defendant had been denied
effective assistance where the trial court refused to grant a continuance and ordered a substi-
tute to represent the defendant, when the defendant's counsel was hospitalized; see also United
States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
140. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, Standard 5-5.2. See also NA-
TIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION RECOM-
MENDATIONS (1976). Recommendation .12 states in part: "Whenever an attorney-client
relationship has been established between an eligible accused and his attorney, the defense
system should not terminate or interfere with that relationship without great justification, and
the attorney should resist efforts by the court to terminate or interfere with that relationship."
141. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) (emphasis added).
142. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 6.
143. The Commentary to ABA Criminal Justice Standard 5-5.3 states that, "To hold that
counsel can be removed from the case of an impecunious defendant regardless of objection
from the client and attorney is to subject such an accused to unjustified discrimination based
solely on poverty." See also Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 68 Cal. 2d 547,
562, 440 P.2d 65, 74, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1968) (to dismiss a court-appointed counsel over the
defendant's objections and under circumstances in which a retained counsel could not be re-
moved, would constitute an "unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely from
the poverty of the accused").
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V. Professional Standards of Competency for the Criminal
Defense Attorney
In light of the difficulties for a defendant who was represented by an
ineffective counsel in obtaining appellate relief, it is crucial that substan-
tial efforts be made to insure that counsel act effectively and competently
at the trial level. If reviewing courts are going to presume compe-
tency, 14 then the profession must clearly indicate to counsel what indeed
must be done to provide competent representation. There have been at-
tempts to provide some guidelines for competent representation, but they
are too general to be of much practical assistance.
A. Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice
In 1972, prominent defense lawyers, law professors, judges, and
prosecutors developed guidelines to encourage representation which
meets constitutional requirements and provides an effective criminal pro-
cess.145 These guidelines, known as the American Bar Association Stan-
dards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice (hereinafter
Criminal Justice Standards) have been described by former Chief Justice
Burger as the "single most comprehensive and probably the most monu-
mental undertaking in the field of criminal justice ever attempted by the
American legal profession in our national history." '146 The Criminal Jus-
tice Standards were designed to provide procedural guidelines for the
practice of criminal law, 47 and constituted "the optimum achievable
consensus on what the relevant law should be."'
148
Chapter Four of the Criminal Justice Standards, "The Defense
Function," describes the proper role of the criminal defense lawyer. The
standards set forth, however, are general and lofty in nature and do not
specify sufficiently the exact work necessary to properly prepare a case.
For example, Chapter Four sets out such standards as: "The basic duty
the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice is to serve
as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to
144. See supra note 101.
145. Proceedings at the National Judicial Conference on Standards for the Administration
of Criminal Justice (Feb. 10-14, 1972) (Baton Rouge), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 229, 240-41
(1973).
146. Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 251 (1974). The Criminal Justice Standards currently in effect are the Second Edition,
1980, with a 1986 Supplement.
147. Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255 (1974).
148. Day, Appellate Court Use of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 415, 420 (1975).
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the utmost of his or her learning and ability and according to law."
14 9
The Commentaries to the Criminal Justice Standards are hardly
more useful. The Commentary to the above Standard, for example,
states in part: "Once a case has been undertaken, a lawyer is obliged not
to omit any essential honorable step in the defense .... ,15o What steps
are "essential"? And what guidance is given counsel by telling him he
should not omit an honorable step? The Criminal Justice Standards are,
however, helpful in inspiring the advocate to devote energy, zeal, dili-
gence, and care to the representation of his client,' and have been cited
by courts in assessing the responsibilities of counsel that are required by
the Sixth Amendment. 52 They have also been cited to support a con-
tempt of court judgment against a lawyer.'
53
B. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
"Whereas the Criminal Justice standards are not model codes or
rules ... [but] are guidelines and recommendations intended to help
criminal justice planners",'5 4 the American Bar Association Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter the Code) does provide rules
for lawyers which serve both as an aspirational guide in the form of Ethi-
cal Considerations, and as a basis for disciplinary action when a lawyer's
conduct violates the minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary
149. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, Standard 4-1.1(b).
150. Id. Standard 4-1.1 (commentary at p. 4.8).
151. Chapter Five of the Standards is entitled, "Providing Defense Services." Standard 5-
1.1 states that "[t]he objective in providing counsel should be to assure that quality legal repre-
sentation is afforded to all persons eligible for counsel pursuant to this chapter." In the His-
tory of the Standard, it is stated that quality representation "contemplates providing to the
accused the same standard of legal services that a defendant of financial means can purchase."
Id. at p. 5.7.
152. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.5 (1983); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
346 n. 11, (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 n.8 (1978); McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207, 216-17 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Standard 4.1, regarding the duty to investigate);
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 25 F.2d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing Stan-
dard 3.5 (b), regarding conflict of interest); United States ex rel. Sabella v. Folette, 432 F.2d
572, 576 n.2 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing Standard 5.2 (b) (Tentative Draft (1970)), regarding the
control and direction of the case); State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 183, 579 P.2d 127, 130 (1978)
(citing Standard 4.1); Weatherall v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 22, 31 n.16, 242 N.W.2d 220, 225 n.16
(1976) (citing Standard 4.0); State v. Thomas, 232 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. 1975); Baxter v.
Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, also mentions
the Criminal Justice Standards stating that they are guides ("but they are only guides"), to
assist a reviewing court in determining whether counsel's performance was reasonable and
conformed to norms of practice.
153. See, e.g., Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719, 725
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
154. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, at p. XX.
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Rules. 5' Canon Six of the Code (A Lawyer Should Represent A Client
Competently) is directly applicable to the defense attorney. The most rel-
evant Disciplinary Rule of Canon Six is DR 6-101:
Failing to Act Competently
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he
is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer
who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
156
Although there was no provision regarding competence in the prior ABA
Canons of Professional Conduct, 157 courts have long held that lawyers
have a responsibility to act competently. 
15
The Code provides little specific guidance for the defense attor-
ney. 59 The Code, for example, does not specifically define competence
beyond that given in the Disciplinary Rule above. As the Conference
Director of the 1981 Conference, "Enhancing the Competence of Law-
yers", 160 stated: "It is characteristic of lawyers dealing with the compe-
tence issue to decide.., that it is impossible to define competence." 
1 61
155. The Preliminary Statement to the Code refers to the Ethical Considerations as "as-
pirational" in character, representing the objectives toward which each attorney shall strive,
and the Disciplinary Rules as "mandatory" in character. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44.
156. Id. Most of the Formal and Informal Opinions of the ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics, interpreting the Code, which concern issues of a lawyer's competence, center on
neglect. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1442 (1979). Informal Opin-
ion 1273 (1973) explains neglect:
Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the obligations
which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious disregard for the responsi-
bility owed to a client .... Neglect usually involves more than a single act or omis-
sion. Neglect cannot be found if the acts or omissions complained of were
inadvertent or the result of an error in judgment made in good faith.
157. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility correlates DR 6-101 (A)(3) only to
Canon 21 concerning the duty to be punctual, concise, and direct in the disposition of cases.
158. See, e.g., Kissam v. Bremerman, 44 N.Y. App. Div. 588, 61 N.Y.S. 75 (1899); Malone
v. Gerth, 100 Wis. 166, 75 N.W. 972 (1898).
159. For a proposal of a Disciplinary Rule that would reflect the sixth amendment require-
ment for effective assistance, see Steinberg, The Disciplinary Rules and Competence of Counsel:
.4 Proposed 41ternative, 11 GONz. L. REV. 133 (1975).
160. ALI-ABA COMMITrEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, REPORT OF
THE HOUSTON CONFERENCE, ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS XI (1981).
161. Id. at X. Little was added by that Conference's attempt to proceed to clarify compe-
tence: "Generally speaking, however, we refer to competence as a personality trait or charac-
teristic or set of habits we wish to inculcate in the lawyer, while good performance is the
typical (but not invariable) action or expression of this trait." The Report of the Houston
Conference, Enhancing the Competence of Lawyers, David Brinks Address to the Conference
xi (1981). But lack of specificity has not prevented widespread use of the term; the President of
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C. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (hereinafter Model Rules) include another attempt to provide guide-
lines for competent representation. The House of Delegates of the ABA
adopted the Model Rules in August, 1983, after years of study and draft-
recommendations by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards. The ABA had intended that the states would adopt the
Model Rules to replace the Code, but, as of early 1986, only eleven states
have done so.162 As a reflection of the increased concern for lawyer com-
petency, the Model Rules have attempted at the outset to particularize
the elements of competence:
RULE 1.1 Competence:
A Lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Com-
petent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for therepresentation. 163
A different section of the Model Rules deals with diligence." 6 As
was true with the Code, however, there are no specific standards describ-
ing what a criminal defense attorney ought to do in preparing a client's
defense in order to insure the effective assistance of counsel.
165
D. The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct
Finally, the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Code of Con-
duct), prepared under the auspices of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial
Lawyers Foundation as an alternative to the Code and the Model Rules,
also attempted to provide guidelines to insure competent representa-
the American Bar Association in 1981-82 has said that "if as we look ahead, there is a single
word that can be used to characterize the likely dominant issue of the 1980"s, that word may be
competence." Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
162. Quo vadis Model Rules?, 72 A.B.A. J. 8 (Apr. 1986). The states that have adopted the
Model Rules are Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Washington. 1 ABA-BNA LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 334, 445, 855, 924, 961, 1026, 1127 (1984-85); 2 ABA-BNA
LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 14 (1986). The unenthusiastic response to
the Model Rules is a sharp contrast to the rapid adoption by the states of the Code: forty
states had adopted the Code within two years of the ABA adoption. Debating the Model
Rules-Critical Points of Contention, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
163. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 45, Rule 1.1.
164. Id. at Rule 1.3: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
165. Particularized standards would provide a useful indicator of what the legal profession
expects of members of the bar, and lawyers who violate the specified requirements of compe-
tent representation could be made subject to discipline. See infra text accompanying notes
177-180.
Summer 1986]
654 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:625
tion. 6 6 Although the Code of Conduct principally concerns the duties of
a trial lawyer, it falls far short of what is required for effective assistance
of counsel. The Preamble emphasizes the notion that concern for the
client is paramount:
Before any person is significantly affected by society in his or her
person, relationships, or property, our system requires that certain
processes be duly followed-processes to which competent, in-
dependent and zealous lawyers are essential. And if it be observed
that the stated ideal is too frequently denied in fact, our response
must be that standards for lawyers be so drafted and enforced as to
strive to make that ideal a reality.
167
The Code of Conduct has not been adopted by any state, and its influence
on the profession has been insignificant. 6 '
E. The Need for Particularized Standards
The majority in Strickland v. Washington opposed the creation of
detailed guidelines for effective representation, claiming that "the exist-
ence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from
the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause."' 69
Justice Marshall's dissent, however, criticized the majority's use of gen-
eral rather than particularized standards:
To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal
defendant must behave "reasonably" and must act like "a reason-
ably competent attorney," ... is to tell them almost nothing. In
essence, the majority has instructed judges called upon to assess
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own
intuitions regarding what constitutes "professional" representa-
tion, and has discouraged them from trying to develop more de-
tailed standards governing the performance of defense counsel.
170
166. AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Revised Draft 1982).
167. Id. Preamble.
168. The antagonism of the sponsors of the Code of Conduct to the A.B.A. is perhaps most
clearly illustrated by the following portion of the Introduction to the Code of Conduct:
The A.B.A. first added the adjective "Model" to the title of its Code to avoid federal
charges that its promulgation of the Code was restraint of trade. The A.B.A. Com-
mission [on Professional Responsibility] now seems to make a virtue of necessity, it
always refers to its workproduct as the Model rules, although it courts federal dis-
pleasure by always calling the CPR "the Code," never the "Model Code." Refusing
to take any A.B.A. product for a model, we consistently refer to existing law as "the
Code of Professional Responsibility" and to what the A.B.A. Commission has rec-
ommended as "the proposed Rules of Professional Conduct."
Id. at n.l.
169. 466 U.S. at 689.
170. Id. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, did not consider the setting of particularized standards flexible enough to ac-
commodate the wide variety of situations that lead to claims of ineffective assistance. Id. at
703-04 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Although Justice Blackmun joined in the
Particularized standards which guide lawyers through every stage of
the criminal proceeding, might actually diminish the number of inade-
quate representation claims. Such standards detailing the steps that
ought to be taken in preparing a case would assist and guide the attorney
in the preparation of the defense in a criminal trial,17 and would be espe-
cially useful to the novice attorney or the lawyer whose specialty is in
another area of law, but who recently has taken on a criminal case.
1 72
Particularized requirements would also enable defendants to under-
stand what is involved in the defense of a case and might well enable
them to more actively participate in the process that so vitally affects
them. Through such standards, the trial judge would be able to monitor
more effectively the quality of representation the defendant was receiv-
ing. Moreover, the lack of specific standards makes it more difficult to
evaluate the competency of the representation provided. This in turn
diminishes the likelihood of obtaining appellate relief for a defendant
who had ineffective counsel at trial. 173
The profession's failure to adopt particularized standards may be
motivated, in part, by a concern that greater specification may increase
the vulnerability of attorneys to malpractice actions.
majority decision in Strickland, his dissent in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 335 n.5
(1981), noted that the "state is responsible for the public defender's office and can attempt to
ensure that clients receive effective assistance of counsel, for example, by hiring qualified per-
sonnel, providing sufficient funding, and enforcing strict standards of competence." (Black-
mun, 3., dissenting) (emphasis added).
171. The Author is a member of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
(NLADA) Defense Counsel Competency Committee which has prepared proposed Perform-
ance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation. The NLADA in the fall of 1986 will
consider the Guidelines for adoption. The Performance Guidelines enumerate specific actions
that counsel should take at various stages of the proceedings in order to effectively represent
his client. The Guidelines are presently organized as follows: 1. General Principles of Repre-
sentation; 2. Pretrial Release; 3. Preliminary Proceedings; 4. General Case Preparation; 5. Pre-
trial Motions; 6. Disposition by Plea; 7. Trial Proceedings; 8. Sentencing; 9. Post-judgment
Proceedings.
172. Former Chief Justice Burger, in his Sonnett lecture at Fordham University Law
School, indicated that new lawyers are greatly in need of assistance and guidance, especially in
criminal cases. Reprinted in Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training
and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227,
231 (1973). See also Siricea, The Art of Legal Advocacy: Duties and Obligations, in LAWYER'S
ETHics 59, 61 (Gerson ed. 1980).
173. Some courts have attempted to develop their own standards to assist in evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance. See, eg., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (specifying distinct duties owed to client); Braxton v. Peyton, 365
F.2d 563, 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 939 (1966); see also People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d
412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979) ("farce and mockery" standard eliminated; basic
duties enumerated).
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VI. Underfunding of Defender Offices and the Resulting
Inadequate Representation by Counsel
Much of the criticism leveled at trial attorneys for inadequate repre-
sentation of their client's interests has focused on those attorneys repre-
senting indigents in criminal cases. The former Chief Judge of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has described the appalling lack of effective
assistance that he has noted in reviewing claims of inadequate
representation:
[T]he battle for equal justice is being lost in the trenches of the
criminal courts where the promise of Gideon and Argersinger goes
unfulfilled. The casualties of those defeats are easy to identify. ...
The prime casualties are defendants accused of street crimes, virtu-
ally all of whom are poor, uneducated, and unemployed. They are
the persons being represented all too often by "walking violations
of the sixth amendment." 174
A. Types of Systems Used for the Delivery of Defense
Services to Indigents
Institutions providing defense representation for indigents began as
volunteer agencies, because traditionally there had been no compensation
for counsel appointed by the court in either the federal or state sys-
tems.1 75 After the Gideon decision in 1963,176 however, Congress passed
the Criminal Justice Act 177 authorizing remuneration for the representa-
tion of indigents by attorneys from a legal aid agency or from the private
bar. 178
Today, states and counties use four types of systems to provide
counsel for indigent defendants: (1) the public defender system, in which
the attorneys are public employees and the office is supported by public
174. Bazelon, Realities, supra note 116, at 811-12 (quoting from Bazelon, Defective Assist-
ance, supra note 52, at 2).
175. See SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
CouRTs: A FIELD STUDY (American Bar Foundation 1965); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1963).
176. See supra note 7.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
178. There were no federal funds forthcoming after the Gideon and Argersinger mandates
for representation in state court; the Criminal Justice Act provided funds only for federal court
representation. At the time of the Argersinger decision, 65% of all felony defendants and 47%
of those charged with misdemeanors were unable to afford legal representation. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE REPORT
ON THE COURTS 79 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N REPORT].
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funds;.7 9 (2) the private defender system, in which a non-profit agency
receives private charitable donations and public funds, and contracts
with the county or state to provide representation;' (3) the assigned
counsel system in which individual private attorneys are appointed to
represent indigent defendants as the need arises;1 and (4) the contract
system, in which a single attorney or a group of attorneys contracts with
a funding source to represent a fixed or maximum number of cases for a
set fee.
B. Studies Revealing the Lack of Effective Assistance to the Poor
Nationwide studies evaluating the delivery of defense services to in-
digents have consistently cited the inadequate representation provided
the poor. In 1973, for example, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) conducted a sixteen month study, financed by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, to assess delivery of de-
fense services in 3,000 counties across the country."8 2 One of the authors
of the final report summed up the findings:
The scope of representation provided for indigent defendants in
many jurisdictions does not meet specific constitutional directives
of the Supreme Court .... Moreover, the resources allocated to
indigent defense services are grossly deficient in light of the needs
of adequate and effective representation. Relatively few indigent
defendants have the benefit of investigation and other expert assist-
ance in their defense. Their advocates are overburdened, under-
trained, and underpaid.'
179. In 1961, two years prior to Gideon, only 2.9% of the nation's counties had defender
systems. E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1961). As of 1982, fifteen
states had a state administered program in which a chief State Public Defender is appointed to
develop and maintain a system of representation for each county in the state. In thirty-two
states there are county systems where the chief public defender for the locality is selected by
the local board of supervisors, county council, or other governing board. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, CRIMINAL
DEFENSE SYSTEMS 2-3 (1984).
180. The Legal Aid Society of New York City is perhaps the best known of this type of
system.
181. Some commentators have characterized systems which divide the caseload between
the public defender and the private bar as "mixed" or "hybrid" systems. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS PUBLICATION R 0009, IMPLEMENTATION OF ARGERSINGER V.
HAMLIN, A PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE 46 (1974); see generally, SPECIAL COMMIT-
TEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NATIONAL
LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 45-70 (1959).
182. The study is published as L. BENNER & B. NEARY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE
(1973) [hereinafter cited as BENNER & NEARY]
183. Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense Services,
12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 667, 684-85 (1975).
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That same year, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals issued its Task Force Report on the Courts
and concluded that "the lack of Financial and manpower resources has
severely crippled the attempts of indigent defense systems to provide
truly effective representation." ' 4 In 1975, the Director of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers concluded:
The grim and unacceptable reality that must be faced after an ob-
jective review of the present status of indigent representation in the
United States is that there has been little awareness in many cities,
counties, and states of the obligation to the indigent, and even less
affirmative action to incur the financial cost to rectify the failure of
the obligation. 85
The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants, in cooperation with the Criminal Justice Sec-
tion, the General Practice Section of the ABA, and the NLADA, held a
hearing in 1982 to examine funding of indigent defense services. The
publication resulting from the hearing186 concluded that public defenders
had too many cases, the financing of criminal defense services for indi-
gents was generally inadequate, and inadequate compensation pressured
appointed counsel to plead their cases out as quickly as possible." 7 The
Report also concluded that in some areas of the country indigent defend-
ants were not provided competent counsel and that indigent defendants
faced injustices simply because of their poverty. The report asserted that
"[w]e must be willing to put our money where our mouth is; we must be
willing to make the constitutional mandate a reality."' 8
Severe deficiencies in the funding of defense services for indigents in
public defender offices have been found in various studies nationwide.' 89
184. BENNER & NEARY, supra note 182, at 77.
185. Friloux, Equal Justice Under the Law: A Myth, Not a Reality, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
691, 707 (1975).
186. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, GIDEON UNDONE! THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (1982) [here-
inafter cited as GIDEON UNDONE]. In explaining the Report's choice of title, it was stated that
"[i]t is clear that unless positive steps are taken to address these problems, the promise of
Gideon v. Wainwright will indeed be undone." Id. at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 3.
189. See, eg., BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES PART
Two: REPORT ON CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES TO THE POOR IN MASSACHUSETTS (1978),
summarized in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-27 ("insufficient funding is the major
problem in providing effective representation for indigent defendants"); AMERICAN BAR AS-
SOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, SITE
EVALUATION TEAM REPORT ON SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN,
supra note 76, at 33 (the San Francisco Public Defender's Office was "woefully underfunded
and, as a consequence, suffered a wide variety of money-related problems"); OHIO PUBLIC
In 1979, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent De-
fendants initiated a study to examine state and local government expend-
itures for representation of the indigent defendant. Three years later the
study produced the most significant, detailed, and comprehensive study
of its kind. The Introduction to the Report summarizes the unfortunate
situation:
Overall, there is abundant evidence in this report that defense serv-
ices for the poor are inadequately funded. As a result millions of
persons in the United States who have a constitutional right to
counsel are denied effective legal representation. Sometimes de-
fendants are inadequately represented; other times, particularly in
misdemeanor cases, no lawyer is provided or a constitutionally de-
fective waiver of counsel is accepted by the court. Defendants suf-
fer quite directly, and the criminal justice system functions
inefficiently, unaided by well trained and dedicated defense law-
yers. There are also intangible costs, as our nation's goal of equal
treatment for the accused, whether wealthy or poor, remains
unattained. I 90
Evaluations of defense systems throughout the country have found
localities violating the Argersinger mandate that no one can lose his lib-
erty if he did not have counsel representing him.191 For example, the
National Center for Defense Management assessed indigent representa-
tion in Nueces County, Texas, in 1978 and concluded that "generally the
DEFENDER COMMISSION, NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, REPORT
ON THE REPRESENTATION AFFORDED INDIGENT PERSONS IN FELONY CASES, ERIE
COUNTY, OHIO 6 (1982) (the Defender Office's budget was cut 15% in 1980-81 even though
the number of arrests had increased 71%); OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, NA-
TIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL REPRE-
SENTATION AFFORDED INDIGENT PERSONS IN CRIMINAL AND ORDINANCE CASES IN THE
COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO, FINAL REPORT 28 (1982) (underfinancing led to
serious understaffing which affected the quality of representation).
190. LEFSTEIN, supora note 76, at 2.
191. See, e.g., NATIONAL DEFENDER INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF FOUR COUNTY PUB-
LIC DEFENDER PROJECTS FOR THE EIGHT B JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IOWA (1979), reported in
LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-18; NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCI-
ATION, ALABAMA STUDY: SURVEY OF LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDED INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-2; NATIONAL
CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, MICHIGAN STATEWIDE STUDY-PHASE I SURVEY
(1978), reported in LEFsTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-29; NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, TENNESSEE COURT STUDY: DEFENSE SYSTEM STUDY (1977), re-
ported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-52 (although Tennessee had a law requiring
appointment of counsel in all misdemeanor cases, even when no jail time could be given as a
sentence, assignments simply were not made in misdemeanor cases and indigents were forced
to proceed without representation).
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county is in flagrant violation ofArgersinger v. Hamlin."' 92 A study con-
ducted by Boston University's Center for Criminal Justice in 1976 as-
sessed the implementation of Argersinger and concluded that the
response to Argersinger has simply been to assign additional cases to al-
ready overwhelmed public defenders, with the result being "that the
sixth amendment right to counsel is an empty one for many
defendants."1 93
Public defender offices are always subject to budget reductions, and
when the county or state becomes particularly hard-pressed, the level of
funding, already at a minimum level, can fall drastically. In New Mex-
ico, the statewide Public Defender program had a twelve percent increase
in felony caseloads in both fiscal year 1981 and 1982, but when the state
needed funds to meet financial obligations, the Public Defender Office
was asked to return $80,000 of its already appropriated budget for fiscal
year 1983.194 After Proposition 13 was passed in California in 1977,195 the
amount of state funds available to county budgets was limited, and an
informal survey taken in the aftermath of Proposition 13 revealed that
defender offices in San Francisco County had a thirty-five percent in-
crease in caseload per attorney and Los Angeles County had a twenty-
eight percent increase.196 The Public Defender office in Alameda
County, in the three years following the adoption of Proposition 13, lost
sixteen percent of its staff while its caseload increased thirty-eight per-
cent.197 Seattle and Philadelphia's Public Defender offices experienced
similar budget Cuts.
198
192. NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, ASSESSMENT OF DEFENSE SERV-
ICES: NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS (1978), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-
58.
193. S. KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD, & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN 5 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as KRANTZ & SMITH].
194. Wilson, Empty-handed Justice, 22 THE JUDGE'S JOURNAL 20 (1983).
195. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 1 (West 1978) limited the annual tax permitted to be set on
real property to 1% of the full value of the property.
196. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Repre-
sentation, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 473, 488 n.66.
197. Portman, Financing the Right to Counsel: A View from a Local Public Defender, 19
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 363, 366-67 (1985).
198. In Seattle (King County), Washington, the Public Defender office received a budget
allocation in 1982 which was 18% lower than the preceding year's spending level even though
the office had in fact previously expressed complaints that its caseloads were too high. Wilson,
supra note 194, at 21-22. It is not just local funds that can be cut. In Philadelphia in 1968,
federal-funds and a private grant that had been supporting a large part of the Defender's
budget, were terminated. Comment, Client Service in a Defender Organization: The Philadel-
phia Experience, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 448, 448 n.2 (1969).
Moreover, in those states where the counties have the full responsi-
bility for financing defense services, the greatest constitutional violations
may occur due to underfunding. 99 Counties with a low tax base often
have the greatest incidence of crime and a high percentage of defendants
unable to afford a private attorney. Where the need, therefore, is the
greatest, the county's ability to finance defense services for indigents may
well be the least. Inadequate funding in these public defender offices re-
sults in a staff of attorneys whose number are insufficient to competently
represent all of the office's clients. In a state-financed system, there can
be more consistency in the delivery of defense services and statewide
standards of competency and performance can be imposed.2 °"
Defendants can be expected to be aware of the failings of the repre-
sentation provided them. Interviews With defendants reveal their lack of
confidence in court-appointed counsel.2 °" The resulting bitterness can
199. See THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL STUDY COMMIS-
SION ON DEFENSE SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES § 2.1 (1976): "Defender services should be organized at the state level in order to
ensure uniformity and equality of legal representation and supporting services, and to guaran-
tee professional independence for individual defenders." See also NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 178, at Standard 13.6. In 1985, more than half the states fi-
nanced all or a majority of the costs of providing public defense services. Wasserman, The
Case for State Financing of Public Defense Services 7, THE DEFENDER, No. 9, at 9 (Nov./Dec.
1985). Oregon was one of the most recent states to transfer responsibility from the county to
the state level. OR. REv. STAT. § 135.055 (Supp. 1984). The state court administrator for the
Oregon Judicial Department has written that the change "was a direct result of local funding
problems. The constant variable in the process was the counties' desire to rid themselves of an
unpopular and largely uncontrollable expense at a time when their finacial resources were
diminishing." Linden, Financing the Right to Counsel: The Oregon Experience, 19 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 399, 400 (1985). California is unique in its two-tiered structure: local financing
for defenders at trial court level and state funding for representation in appellate court. See
Meeting the Challenge: A Panel Discussion of Political Leaders, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 417
(1985).
200. Since it is the state laws which govern the commission of serious crimes anywhere
within the state, the state ought to be obligated to provide the funds required to insure ade-
quate representation to those indigents charged with violating the laws of the state.
201. Interviews with defendants charged with felonies in Connecticut revealed that only
20.4% of those represented by public defenders responded affirmatively to the question, "do
you think [your lawyer] was on your side?" whereas 100% of defendants with privately-re-
tained counsel answered positively. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFEND-
ANT'S PERSPECTIVE 105 (1972). See also Arcuri, Lawyers, Judges and Plea Bargaining: Some
New Data on Inmate Views, in INT'L J. OF CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 177 (1976) (inmates
with private lawyers were twice as likely as those with appointed counsel to believe they got a
good defense). A study of prisoners in Texas concluded that "[tihe prisoners felt that private
counsel is better prepared than his publicly supported counterpart." Alpert, Inadequate De-
fense Counsel: An Empirical Analysis of Prisoners' Perceptions, 7 AM. J. OF CRIM. L. 1, 17
(1979). Sixty-three percent of the prisoners answered "no", to the question "did your lawyer
discuss defense strategies with you?" Id. at 11. An evaluation of Florida defendants' re-
sponses to their representation similarly revealed that only 41% of those defendants with pub-
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only increase the anger and resentment felt by a convicted defendant to-
ward "the system", after he is released from prison.2 °2
The plight of an underfunded public defender office where the attor-
neys are overburdened with cases has been found to lead to inadequate
representation in many forms: the attorneys may not have sufficient time
to study police reports in advance of preliminary hearings so as to be able
to maximize their cross examination of the prosecution witnesses;
20 3
there are insufficient funds to hire expert witnesses and the applications
that defenders must make to the court for funds for experts are fre-
quently denied;204 there is insufficient time to plan strategy or subpoena
witnesses;2 °5 there is minimal use of pre-trial discovery;20 6 witnesses must
be interviewed when they are caught in the courthouse corridors;20 7 there
is little or no training program 20 8 and new, inexperienced lawyers may be
lie defenders believed that the attorney used "all legal means possible to aid the client," as
contrasted to 71% of those with privately retained attorneys. Berger & Handberg, Symbolic
Justice: Disappointed Client Views of Their Attorneys, 2 CRIM. JUST. REV. 113, 114 (1977).
See also, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 337 (Bantam ed.
1968) ("The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that lower courts in our urban commu-
nities dispense 'assembly-line' justice; that from arrest to sentencing, the poor and uneducated
are denied equal justice with the affluent."). The situation seems to be the same concerning
representation provided by public defenders in juvenile courts. See Platt, Schechter & Tiffany,
In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619, 633
(1968) ("The structural demands under which the public defender operates make it apparent
to his clients that he is not 'their' advocate--dedicated to the best defense possible.") [hereinaf-
ter cited as Platt, In Defense of Youth].
202. For a discussion of inmate bitterness toward the lack of vigorous advocacy by counsel,
see N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, § 1, at 6, col. 3, an article concerning the grievances of inmates
that led to the 1970 jail disturbances in New York City. The disrespect that defendants have
for their Legal Aid counsel is illustrated by an investigative reporter's description of inmate
conversations: "'You got a lawyer?' is the question most often asked in the cells. 'No,' goes
the answer. 'I got Legal Aid.'" Pileggi, The Last Liberals: LegalAid Under Siege, New York
Magazine 29, 35 (Sept. 13, 1982). See also Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to
Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE L. REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 4 (1971).
203. LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at 35.
204. Id. at 37-38.
205. Id. at 43.
206. NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT EVALUATION:
-DEFENDER CORPORATION OF GREENVILLE COUNTY, GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA
(1978), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-48.
207. Bazelon, Realities, supra note 116.
208. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM REPRESENTING THE ABA STANDING COM-
MIrrEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS EVALUATING THE SAN FRANCISCO
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 105, at 36
(caseload pressures and limited resources prohibit the "luxury" of a substantial training
program).
forced into trial against a highly-experienced adversary;2" 9 and defend-
ants become depersonalized and are not treated as individualized
clients.210
The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association has called
for improvement in the system for providing indigent defense services on
six occasions from 1979 to 1983--"a virtually unprecedented demonstra-
tion of concern about one subject by our House" testified an ABA repre-
sentative before a House Judiciary Subcommittee.211
VII. Specific Deficiencies in Representation Resulting from
Excessive Caseload
A. Inadequate Case Preparation
The aspects of representation that suffer most when the defender is
confronted with an excessive caseload are the preparation and investiga-
tion of the case,212 and effective communication between the attorney
and his client. Thorough preparation of a case is perhaps the most im-
portant aspect of effective advocacy.213 The most able attorney cannot
209. NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT EVALUATION:
DEFENDER CORPORATION OF GREENVILLE COUNTY, GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA
(1978), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-48.
210. S. BING & S. ROSENFELD, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN THE LOWER CRIMINAL
COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON 31 (1970).
211. Testimony of Lionel Barrett, on behalf of the American Bar Association, before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice I
(July 14, 1983).
212. See, eg., S. SINGER, B. LYNCH & R. SMITH, INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
(1978), reprinted in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-1 (site visits and mail question-
naires to 399 defender agencies found that caseload pressures directly coincided with inade-
quate preparation time). The National Center for Defense Management in its evaluation of the
Santa Clara County, California Public Defender Systems, concluded that because of the 502
cases that the average attorney represented in 1976, careful attorney preparation was impossi-
ble (reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-12); Bazelon, Realities, supra note
116, at 830 (lack of preparation is the most common failing of counsel); Maddi, Trial Advo-
cacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 AMER. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 105, 144
(a majority of judges ranked preparation as the most important factor in determining a trial
lawyer's competence).
213. The Third Circuit, in reversing the conviction upon finding inadequate representation
by counsel, stated:
[A]dequate preparation for trial often may be a more important element in the effec-
tive assistance of counsel to which a defendant is entitled than the forensic skill ex-
hibited in the courtroom. The careful investigation of a case and the thoughtful
analysis of the information it yields may disclose evidence of which even the defend-
ant is unaware and may suggest issues and tactics at trial which would otherwise not
emerge.
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Levine, Preventing Defense
Counsel Error-An Analysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and Their Impli-
cations for Professional Regulation, 15 TOLEDO L. REV. 1275, 1371 (1984) (analysis of claims
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render effective assistance in tLte defense of his client if his lack of prepa-
ration before, during, and after)-trial prevents the attorney from learning
readily available information that would have resulted in a more
favorable plea bargain, a justifiable defense at trial, or a more lenient
sentence after conviction.214 The most frequently successful appeal
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel arises from the failure of
counsel to adequately investigate the case and to call defense
witnesses.215
Attorneys who work in public defender offices commonly complain
of an excessive caseload which prohibits their having adequate time to
prepare their cases. 2 6 A study of 100 trial attorneys in Cook County
(Chicago) examined attorney assessment of the competency of other trial
lawyers. In reply to the question: "Among those [attorneys] doing a less
than competent job, what are their major deficiencies?", the most com-
mon response cited by over half of the responding lawyers was lack of
preparation.
217
filed in Michigan from 1969 to 1981 revealed that the most frequent type of allegation of
ineffective assistance was the failure of counsel to investigate or introduce defense evidence);
Brosnahan, Basic Principles ofAdvocacy: One Trial Lawyer's View, in THE DOCKET, vol. 9, no.
3, at 1 (Nat'l Inst. for Trial Advoc., Summer 1985); State v. Bush, 255 S.E.2d 539, 542 (,V. Va.
Ct. App. 1979) (there is a substantial relationship between time to prepare for a criminal trial
and the quality of representation provided by the defense).
214. See Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166, 182-83 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
215. See In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 340 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2874 (1985); United
States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103 (5th Cir.
1979); see also Note, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 299, 304 (1973) (lack of
pre-trial investigation and preparation is perhaps the reason most often cited by appellate
courts in Texas for reversal on effective assistance grounds). But see Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), which involved the defendant's claim that his attorney had not conducted
a proper investigation prior to the sentencing hearing on the capital offense conviction, and
where the Court found that counsel's decision not to conduct an expanded investigation repre-
sented a professionally reasonable strategic choice. The Court further noted that there must be
a heavy measure of deference to counsel's decision regarding investigations.
216. See, e.g., BING & ROSENFELD, supra note 210, at 31 (complaints of lawyers in the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee emphasize the lack of adequate preparation time); RE-
PORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM REPRESENTING THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ON DEFENSE SERVICES IN PRINCE GEORGES
COUNTY, MARYLAND (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at 46 ("As a result of
caseload pressures, attorneys complain that they do not have adequate time to prepare for
court proceedings.").
217. Maddi, Improving TrialAdvocacy: The Views of Trial Attorneys, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 1049, 1071-72. A study of experienced lawyers appearing in the federal district
courts revealed that 45% considered inadequate advocacy by appointed criminal defense coun-
sel to pose a "serious problem"; "failure to prepare cases to the best of ability" was cited as one
of the two most frequent causes of inadequate trial performance. PARTRIDGE & BERMANT,
supra note 76, at 16.
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Judges seem to share this concern. The Advocacy Committee of the
American Bar Association requested the American Bar Foundation to
research the views of the judiciary on advocacy competence. 218 Once
again, inadequate preparation was identified as the most prevalent form
of incompetence, and more than fifty percent of those responding listed
preparation as the most significant factor affecting competence.219
Comprehensive preparation of a case involves an investigation of all
the facts surrounding the crime. 22 0 This usually entails visiting the scene,
obtaining and examining evidence, locating and interviewing defense
221
and prosecution witnesses,222 and consulting with possible experts to as-
sist in preparing the case and possibly testifying during the trial.
223
Courts have long recognized that "effective assistance refers not only to
218. Maddi, supra note 212. All state and federal judges sitting in trial courts were sur-
veyed and 26% responded.
219. Id. at 144. See also PARTRIDGE & BERMANT, supra note 76, where federal judges
cited the failure of attorneys to adequately prepare cases as one of the two most frequent
causes of the inadequate trial performance of appointed criminal defense counsel appearing in
the federal courts.
220. The Chairman of the ABA Litigation Section's Committee on Trial Practice has em-
phasized the thoroughness required:
By preparation of the advocate I mean thorough examination of each strength and
weakness, each fact, each principle of law, each witness, each document, uninter-
rupted analysis of the consistencies and inconsistencies in the case, ability to focus on
the weak parts of the case and determine how they will be met. It is complete ab-
sorption, total immersion in the case so that one's response at the time of trial can be
instantaneous.
Brosnahan, supra note 213, at 1.
221. Ineffective assistance of counsel may be presumed when an attorney has failed to in-
terview potentially crucial witnesses. Eldridge v. Atkins, 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974). See also
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968) (ineffective assistance found where the attorney
failed to interview an eyewitness to the alleged rape and to clearly inform the defendant of the
elements of the charge); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963) (failure to contact witnesses and to assert an obvious defense led to a finding
of ineffective assistance).
222. Failure to interview prosecution witnesses may constitute a violation of the lawyer's
constitutional obligation to render effective assistance. Marrow v. Parratt, 574 F.2d 411 (8th
Cir. 1978). See also Eldridge v. Atkins, 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
910 (1982).
223. In some cases, the assistance of an expert might become as crucial as that of the
attorney himself. See Assistance to the Indigent Person Charged with Crime, 2 GA. ST. B.J.
197, 202 (1965). Courts have often held that when facts are known or should have become
known to counsel that cast a reasonable doubt on the competence or sanity of the defendant,
the attorney has an obligation to seek expert advice in assisting counsel in any defense of
insanity. See, e.g., Profitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 910 (1980); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976); Wood v.
Zahradnick, 430 F. Supp. 107, 111 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd and remanded for further proceed-
ings, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court recently took note of the crucial nature
of expert psychiatric assistance in its holding in Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). See
supra note 81.
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forensic skills but to painstaking investigation in preparation for trial."2 24
The ABA Criminal Justice Standard 4-4.1 states that the lawyer has
a duty to promptly investigate the circumstances of the case. Courts
have cited and relied upon that standard in resolving appeals based on
claimed ineffectiveness of counsel.2 25 In the ABA Criminal Justice Stan-
dards, a Commentary in Chapter 11 (Discovery and Procedure Before
Trial) explains the extreme import of such a duty:
[T]he realist knows that effectiveness at trial depends upon meticu-
lous evaluation and preparation of the evidence to be presented at
trial. Where the necessary evaluation and preparation are fore-
closed by lack of information, the trial becomes a pursuit of truth
and justice only by chance rather than by design, and generates a
diminished respect for the criminal justice system, the judiciary,
and the attorney participants.
226
Despite the Criminal Justice Standards and court pronouncements,
caseload pressures and insufficient funding have led to widespread fail-
ings by defenders of their duty to investigate.227
224. Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Gueldner v. Heyd, 311
F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (E.D. La. 1970) ("It is axiomatic that effective presentation of a case
before a jury is premised on diligent and adequate trial preparation."); Van Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708 (1948) (the defendant is entitled to rely on his lawyer to investigate the facts and
circumstances involved in the case); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert denied,
393 U.S. 849 (1968) (counsel must conduct legal and factual investigations to determine if
matters of defense can be developed); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970)
(for the effective assistance of counsel, adequate preparation for trial may be a more important
element than the forensic skill exhibited in court); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (the failure to investigate, research, and prepare is
equivalent to no representation at all); Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 588 (N.D. Tex.
1967) (the lawyer who does not seek out all facts relevant to his client's case is prepared to do
little more than stand still at time of trial).
225. See, e.g., Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1460 (8th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Hilton,
563 F. Supp. 913, 918-19 (N.J. 1982); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424, 590 P.2d 859, 866,
152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979); State v. Jury, 19 Wash. App. 256, 263-64, 576 P.2d 1302, 1307
(1978); State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 184, 579 P.2d 127, 129 (1978); Kimbrough v. State, 352
So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216 (8th Cir.
1974); People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 421, 514 P.2d 69, 71 (1973).
226. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, Commentary to Standard 11-1.1.
227. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN GREENVILLE, SO. CAR. (1978), reported in LEFSTEIN,
supra note 76, at Appendix F-48 (inadequate trial preparation, minimal use of pretrial discov-
ery procedures, and ineffective use of expert testimony were the results of excessive caseload
pressures); THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM REPRESENTING THE ABA STAND-
ING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ON DEFENSE SERVICES IN
PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at 46
(lawyers often represented defendants with virtually no preparation); REPORT OF THE INVES-
TIGATIVE TEAM REPRESENTING THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE EVALUATING THE SAN
FRANCISCO PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at 35
(attorneys often do not have sufficient time to conduct investigations); NATIONAL CENTER
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B. Insufficient Consultation with the Client
The ability to conduct a thorough investigation is also hindered by
the lawyer's lack of time to fully consult and communicate with his cli-
ent. If a lawyer cannot ascertain from his client all the details concerning
the event, his investigation will suffer. The indigent defendant may view
his defender at first with suspicion since the same source of funds that is
paying the police to arrest him and the prosecutor to prosecute him, is
also paying for his counsel.228 The defender needs to win over the trust
and confidence of the defendant,229 but the hurried attorney anxiously
wishing to conclude the interview so that he can go to the next court and
see other defendants, is not likely to invite and encourage his client's
trust.
2 30
Proper consultation requires that the lawyer keep his client fully in-
formed of the progress of preparing the defense. In 1879, the Supreme
Court recognized that "it is the duty of the attorney to advise the client
FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, ASSESSMENT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN JACKSON
COUNTY, OREGON (1978), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-52 (investiga-
tion commonly is not performed); NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
TENNESSEE COURT STUDY: DEFENSE SYSTEM STUDY (1977), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra
note 76, at Appendix F-52 (preparation often proceeds without investigation and expert testi-
mony); CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN MARION COUNTY, INDIANA (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN,
supra note 76, at Appendix F-16 (caseloads in the court systems studied were found to be too
large to allow a reasonable amount of preparation in any given case).
228. In 1970-71, a study of defendants in Connecticut revealed that most perceived of their
state-paid defenders as middlemen or as prosecutors' assistants. Casper, supra note 202, at 4.
Defendants are not alone in viewing such a system with alarm. Judge Edward Dimock
warned, prior to the emergence of many public defender systems, that "[w]e should never yield
one inch of ground in the struggle against a police state where the government, when it prose-
cutes a man, purports also to defend him." Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards a
Police State? 42 A.B.A. J. 219, 220 (1956). See also Sudnow, Normal Crime: Sociological
Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255 (1965) (observation
of a public defender office in California led to the conclusion that whereas the private attor-
ney's primary focus was on his client, the defender's concern was the perpetuation of his rela-
tionship with other functionaries in the courtroom); Platt, In Defense of Youth, supra note 201,
at 631 ("the Court's functionaries see themselves as colleagues rather than as
adversaries.... .").
229. See Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162
(1982) ("Basic trust between counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system
and effective assistance of counsel."); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (attorney-client relationship demands personal faith and confidence so that they can
work together harmoniously). Even an unpleasant lawyer-client relationship does not relieve
the lawyer of his duty to communicate with his client. State Bar v. Watkins, 655 P.2d 529, 530
(Nev. 1982).
230. Professor Beany in Beaney, Right to Counsel, THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN LAW
AND ACTION 147 (S. Nagel ed. 1972), has observed that "the instances where the public de-
fender must ask the bailiff who the defendant is, and then quickly takes him out to the hall to
confer are all too numerous." Id. at 168.
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promptly whenever he has any information to give which.., the client
should receive."'231 Additionally, courts have emphasized the impor-
tance of frequent and meaningful communication between the defendant
and his attorney.232 Consequently, courts have found ineffective assist-
ance when attorneys have failed in this responsibility.
233
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards 4-3.6 and 4-3.8 require the
lawyer to keep his client informed. Nevertheless, evaluations of defense
systems have found grossly inadequate communication between attorney
and client.234 It appears that indigent clients are not receiving equal jus-
231. Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 500 (1879). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, EC 9-2: "In order to avoid misunderstandings and
hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material
developments in the matters being handled for the client."
232. See, e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945) (the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated when there is no opportunity for the defendant to consult with his defender after
indictment and arraigtiment); Tompkins v. State of Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489 (1945) (in-
formed, knowledgeable advice from the attorney is needed to overcome a client's bewilderment
or ignorance); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (the client must understand
how the applicable statutory provisions of the law relate to the facts of his case); Braxton v.
Peyton, 365 F.2d 563, 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 939 (1966) (the assigned lawyer
should confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary to inform him of
his rights); State ex reL Dehning v. Rigg, 251 Minn. 120, 122, 86 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1957)
(assistance of counsel requires consultations that are, at a minimum, sufficiently adequate to
inform the defendant of his rights); In re Colson, 632 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1982) (the duty to
communicate derives from the overall obligations of the lawyer to his client); In re Bretz, 168
Mont. 23, 542 P.2d 1227 (1975) (the client cannot properly make decisions affecting his case
unless the lawyer has communicated with him); In re Ratzel, 108 Wis. 2d 447, 321 N.W.2d
543 (1982) (it is the duty of the lawyer to communicate all material facts and problems affect-
ing the client).
233. See, e.g., Turner v. Maryland, 318 F.2d 852, 853-54 (4th Cir. 1963) (attorney's failure
to communicate with his client during the two weeks before trial constituted "deplorable disre-
gard" of his client and risked overlooking significant helpful information which the defendant
might have in his possession); Windom v. Cook, 423 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1970) (counsel had not
discussed the elements of the crime nor discovered from the defendant the facts of the case).
234. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA (1978), reported in LEF-
STEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-48 (finding that excessive caseloads have resulted in insuf-
ficient attorney-client contact); THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM REPRESENTING
THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT ON DEFENSE SERVICES IN
PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at 46
(found that there was frequently no advance communication between an attorney and his cli-
ent charged with a misdemeanor in the District Court); THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR DE-
FENSE MANAGEMENT STUDY OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN SAGINAW COUNTY,
MICHIGAN (1977), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-36 (found that attor-
neys often fail to contact clients promptly, and rarely visit clients in jail); see also, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STUDY OF INDIGENT DE-
FENSE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA (1977), reported in LEFSTEIN,
supra note 76, at Appendix F-50 (counsel were believed to be devoting insufficient time to
consulting with and listening to clients); NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT,
STATE OF KANSAS, SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STUDY (1978), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note
tice with those who pay well for an attorney's time and who, in return,
receive counsel's consultation, attention, and communication. 35 More-
over, when defendants are incarcerated pretrial, caseload pressures may
well prohibit the defender from having time available to go to the jail to
consult with his client.236
C. Improper Plea Bargaining
The significance of counsel's failure to adequately investigate and
communicate with his client is revealed in an examination of the plea
bargaining process. The entry of a guilty plea is a critical stage of the
76, at Appendix F-20 (counsel were appointed only after the first court appearances and visits
to the jail by counsel to consult with their clients were infrequent).
235. Professor Casper, in J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENDANT'S
PERSPECTIVE (1972), examined the relationship between public defenders and their clients and
concluded that: "This relationship leads most defendants . . . [to] wonder whether 'their'
attorney is on their side. He doesn't spend much time with them; he doesn't seem concerned
with them as persons; rather, he is concerned with the disposition." Ad. at 17. In sharp con-
trast to this is Professor Casper's analysis of the relationship that defendants have with private
attorneys:
An entirely different area surrounded the defendant's notions of his relationship with
his attorney. In part, this sense of greater satisfaction was the product of different
behavior by their attorney. Enjoying substantially lighter caseloads, the private at-
torney was reported to have spent much more time with his client. Unlike the public
defenders, the private attorneys were reported to have visited clients in jail and to
have spent time discussing the case with the client.
Id. at 115-16. A survey of California Superior and Municipal Court Judges in San Diego
contrasted the services provided to indigent defendants with those received by defendants hav-
ing retained private counsel, and revealed that Superior and Municipal Court Judges perceived
that private counsel "handled their clients" more adequately and that clients' satisfaction with
their defense services was greater. HUGHES, HEISS AND ASSOCIATES, A PLAN FOR PROVID-
ING INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY 70-71, 76-77 (1977). A study of
prisoners in a Florida jail, contrasting the representation given by public defenders to that of
private counsel, found that the public defenders' repeated failure to fully communicate and
keep clients informed caused clients to feel as if they were arbitrarily processed through the
system without being heard. In addition, the prisoners believed that the "private attorney is
more responsive to the psychological needs of clients while the public defender may consider
such considerations as relatively immaterial since the client pays no fees (except taxes gener-
ally) and lacks the time to conduct such 'stroking' activities." Berger & Handberg, supra note
201, at 115. The study further found that after the first meetings between attorneys and their
clients, 71% of defendants with private lawyers felt the lawyer would help them whereas only
36% of defendants represented by public defenders so believed. The researchers explained
that, "The disparity in first impressions may reflect the private attorney's ability to appear
more 'interested' in the client while the public defender tends toward greater impersonality
given greater case load." Id. Ninety-three percent of those who had private counsel would
choose to be represented by private counsel again, whereas only 15% of those who had public
defenders would choose public defenders again. Id.
236. See, eg., Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City
of New York, at 12, Wallace v. Kern, No. 73-1826 (2d Cir. June 27, 1973) (caseloads of Legal
Aid lawyers were so excessive that virtually no interviews were held with jailed defendants
because lawyers had insufficient time to visit the jail facility).
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proceedings and requires effective2 37 and competent counsel.238 It in-
volves the defendant's waiving the right to confront witnesses,239 the
right to challenge the introduction of evidence to be used against him,24
and the right to a trial by a jury of his peers.241 The Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of the plea bargaining process, 242 and recog-
nized that it is an indispensable aspect of the criminal justice system.243
ABA Criminal Justice Standard 4-6.1 warns the defense attorney
that "[u]nder no circumstances should a lawyer recommend to a defend-
ant acceptance of a plea unless a full investigation and study of the case
has been completed, including an analysis of controlling law and the evi-
dence likely to be introduced at trial." 2 " Since any informed decision to
plead guilty must consider the likelihood of conviction were the case to
go to trial, investigation is needed to accurately determine the strength of
the prosecution's case.245 Counsel, therefore, needs to speak to witnesses,
investigate possible defenses, and examine instances of possible police
misconduct that could lead to a successful motion to suppress evidence
that would be needed to convict the defendant. Research into relevant
case law regarding the offense charged may also be required because the
defendant's belief that he is guilty in fact may not coincide with the ele-
ments of the statute that must be proven in order to establish guilt as a
237. United States ex rel. Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (7th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (a guilty plea entered without effective assistance of counsel is
invalid).
238. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (the advice of counsel regarding
plea considerations must be "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in crimi-
nal cases.").
239. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
240. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 770-71.
241. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
242. Id. at 749-55.
243. Blackedge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
260-61 (1971). Plea bargaining is a procedure now accepted and regulated by the ABA Crimi-
nal Justice Standards (supra note 46, Chapter 14, Pleas of Guilty), the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure (ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 350.3
(1975)), the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (NCCUSL, UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 443 (1975)), and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FED. R. CRIM. P. 11).
But see NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, STAN-
DARD 3.1 (1973), (stating that "as soon as possible, but in no event later than 1978, negotia-
tions between prosecutors and defendants... concerning concessions to be made in return for
guilty pleas should be prohibited.")
244. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, Standard 4-6.1(b) (emphasis ad-
ded). See also id. Standard 4-4.1, stating that "It]he duty to investigate exists regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's
stated desire to plead guilty."
245. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Va. 1972) (the plea
bargining process "contemplates the pursuit by counsel of factual and legal theories in order to
reach a conclusion as to whether a contest would best serve the attorney's client's interest.").
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matter of law.24 6 Information discovered from investigation which may
reveal unexpected weaknesses in the prosecution's case may then be used
during plea negotiations to attain a more favorable plea than would
otherwise have been possible.247
The decision to plead guilty and not risk trial is for the defendant to
make after consultation with his lawyer.24 8 This necessitates that the
lawyer spend time with the defendant, communicating all he has learned
of the strength of the prosecution's case and the applicable issues of law,
and advising his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative.2 49
Courts have held that the following constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel: When a defendant pleads guilty without a full explanation of
the consequences of the plea;250 when counsel, without familiarizing him-
self with the facts of the case or investigating possible defenses, allowed
his client to plead guilty;251 when counsel failed, prior to the entry of the
plea, to investigate and utilize governmental records which were exculpa-
tory;252 and when a guilty plea was entered on the same day that a lawyer
246. The Commentary to Standard 4-6.1 governing plea bargaining states:
In all circumstances, defense counsel should challenge the government's case if there
is genuine doubt that the prosecution can carry its burden of proof. That the accused
is guilty in fact is, of course, not relevant. It is not the function of the advocate to
make a moral judgment as to the guilt of the accused.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, supra note 46, Commentary to Standard 4-6.1, p. 4.73.
247. A survey of defense lawyers in Phoenix, Arizona indicated that lawyers who interview
the victims of the alleged crime have greater success in obtaining a reduction of the charge as
part of the negotiated plea. They also had a better chance of persuading prosecutors to recom-
mend more lenient sentences than did defense counsel who had not interviewed the victim.
Comment, Investigation of Facts in Preparation for Plea Bargaining, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 557,
574. Biskind's trial manual indicates that the skill with which a defense lawyer has investi-
gated and prepared his case determines to a large extent the success of any plea negotiation. E.
BISKIND, How TO PREPARE A CASE FOR TRIAL 71 (1954).
248. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 45, EC 7-7 ("the
authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client, and if made within the framework
of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer...."); see also id., Rule 1.2(a) ("in a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the law-
yer, as to a plea to be entered ... ").
249. See id., EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his
client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations."); Herring v.
Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (the client must be counseled as to how the applicable
statutory provisions of the law relate to the facts of the defendant's case); Murray v. Florida,
384 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (the client must be informed of plea proposals made by the
prosecution).
250. See, e.g., Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
916 (1967).
251. Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Walker v. Caldwell, 476
F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973).
252. United States v. Norman, 412 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1969). But see State v. Nielsen, 547
S.W.2d 153 (Mo. App. 1977) (the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel after a plea is proper only
as to the issues of voluntariness and understanding of the plea).
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intially consulted with his client, leading to a presumption that there had
been an inadequate preparation of a defense.253
In many public defender offices the caseload of the staff attorney is
so great that in order for the attorney to "process" all his cases, he must
recommend to many of his clients that they plead guilty. That guilty
plea is not usually the climax of a long and thorough investigation con-
ducted by counsel. Rather, it can be a mechanism for relieving the de-
fender of the need to prepare that case. As a study of the plea bargaining
process in Boston revealed, "the MDC [Massachusetts Defenders Com-
mittee] uses plea bargaining freely, to obtain the defendant's freedom
while avoiding the time necessary to provide a full defense at trial ....
For the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, plea bargaining becomes a
necessary technique to deal with an overwhelming caseload."'254 Similarly,
an evaluation of a public defender office in Ohio found a "high rate of
negotiated pleas which is critical to the survival of the public defender
office at the present caseload ratios."255 The resources of many defender
offices are insufficient to provide for the trial of more than a small frac-
tion of the cases handled. A nationwide study involving 399 defender
agencies focusing in part on plea bargaining, concluded:
The larger the area served by the agency, the more excessive the
caseloads. Caseload pressures coincide with inadequate prepara-
tion time. Also, as attorney caseloads increase, so do guilty plea
rates. Agencies that report low guilty plea rates (under 20%) all
have average attorney caseloads of less than 50 cases per year. At-
torney caseloads, therefore, appear to be a factor in guilty plea
rates.256
Indigent defendants, entitled to vigorous counsel investigating their
cases and preparing their defenses for trial, instead may be represented
by counsel, who for lack of adequate time to devote to their cause, are
253. Bryant v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D. W.Va. 1967) (when a plea quickly follows
the initial consultation there may be a suspicion either of neglect or that the guilty plea was
prompted by the pressure of time, preventing full preparation of defense).
254. BING & ROSENFELD, supra note 210, at 32 (emphasis added); see also Blumberg, The
Practice of Law as Confidence Game, 1 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 15, 38 (June 1967) (insufficient
time to handle caseloads pressures legal aid counsel to suggest a plea of guilty at the initial
interview with the defendant).
255. OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DE-
FENDER ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE REPRESENTATION AFFORDED INDIGENT PERSONS
IN FELONY CASES, ERIE COUNTY, OHIO 6 (1982) (emphasis added).
256. NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INDIGENT DEFENSE SYS-
TEMS ANALYSIS (1978), summarized in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at Appendix F-1. See also
GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 186 (inadequate compensation puts pressure on appointed coun-
sel to plead their cases out as quickly as possible).
advising them to plead guilty.
257
D. Insufficient Input into the Sentencing Process
Sentencing is also a stage of the proceeding where the indigent de-
fendant is likely to be disadvantaged by his defender's lack of time. The
Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay2 58 held that sentencing was a critical
stage of a criminal prosecution at which the defendant was guaranteed
counsel to assist "in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of miti-
gating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to
present his case as to sentence. ' 25 9 Sentencing has been referred to by
one circuit court of appeals as the stage which "may well be the most
important part of the entire proceeding. '260  Counsel, therefore, must
have sufficient time to prepare argument for the sentencing judge.26 I
Yet, supervisors of defender offices, anxious to insure that each attorney
processes as many cases as possible, often discount the import of the
work and time required to prepare for the sentencing hearing.
262
257. See REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM REPRESENTING THE ABA STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS EVALUATING THE SAN FRAN-
CISCO COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at 35
(the public defender attorneys interviewed acknowledged that due to lack of time, cases that
probably should have been tried terminated instead with the client pleading guilty on advice of
counsel); see also D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDI-
GENT 158 (1968) (private lawyers generally plead their clients guilty less often and take more
of their cases to trial than do public defenders); L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 53-55 (1965) (a study of thirty counties in
fourteen states found that clients of public defenders consistently pled guilty more often than
clients of private attorneys, and in twenty-six of twenty-eight counties the clients of public
defenders were sentenced to jail more often and received more severe sentences). Professor
Casper, in AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE, supra note 235,
described what he found to be the relationship between the public defender and his client:
Public defenders ... are greatly overburdened, handling a volume of cases far beyond
their capacity to give anyone sufficient personal attention .... The conversations are
brief; they center not around the circumstances and motives of the crime, potential
legal defenses, defendant's needs and desires, but around the "deal"-what can be
obtained in return for a guilty plea.
Id. at 16-17.
258. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
259. Id. at 135. See also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (for a reasonably
competent lawyer to render effective assistance, he must discharge his duties at sentencing).
260. United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
261. United States v. DiNapoli, 519 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1975).
262. An example of this can be seen from the response of one supervisor to a staff attor-
ney's claim that he had too many cases to work on and still be able to provide effective assist-
ance. The supervisor, in examining the case files of the complaining attorney to ascertain the
total amount of work needing to be done, "was not particularly interested in the sentencing
cases .... " In the Matter of the Arbitration between the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys
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A survey comparing the representation provided at the sentencing
stage by public defenders with that of private counsel in Phoenix, Ari-
zona reveals the impact of a heavy caseload.263 That study found that
privately retained counsel were almost twice as likely as public defenders
to arrange a meeting with the probation officer who was preparing a sen-
tencing memorandum for the court. Private counsel more often submit-
ted written statements on behalf of their clients to the probation officer,
were more active in seeking out family and friends of their client to sub-
mit letters of support, more often spent time preparing their clients for
the interview with the probation officer, and more often attempted to
verify the accuracy of questionable information found in the probation
of the City of New York and the Legal Aid Society, Suspension of Steven Leventhal, Opinion
and Award, American Arbitration Association Case Number 1330-1350-82, at 20 (1983).
The attorney must present to the court not just broad-based generalized appeals for
mercy, but rather specific information concerning the defendant's background, family ties and
responsibilities, employment history and prospects (including any statement from potential or
past employers willing to hire the defendant were he not to be incarcerated), educational back-
ground, and mitigating circumstances concerning the offense committed. Additionally, the
attorney should report detailed information concerning the defendant's prior criminal record
which may act to diminish its overall impact and severity. In appropriate cases, he should
present specific plans for alternatives to incarceration, such as drug rehabilitation programs,
which may alleviate the judge's concerns that would otherwise lead him to incarcerate the
defendant. Counsel needs to spend time with the Probation Officer who may be preparing a
sentencing report for the judge and arrange for the defendant's family, employers, and drug
program officials to communicate with the probation officer. See Russell v. Jones, 647 P.2d
904 (Ore. 1982) (the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the pre-sentence interview by the
probation investigator preparing the report for the judge was a stage of the proceeding at
which there was a right for the defendant to have the assistance of counsel). For a strong
statement and rationale of the needs for defense counsel to be present at the pre-sentence
interview, see Kuh, Trial Techniques: Defense Counsel's Role in Sentencing, 14 CRIM. L.
BULL. 434, 435 (1978); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, Standard
18-5.4(a), concerning the obligation of counsel to rebut any information in the probation of-
ficer's report that is either unverified or derogatory to the defendant; NCCUSL, MODEL SEN-
TENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT 3-206 (1979), enabling defense counsel to get a
postponement of at least ten days after the filing of the probation department's sentencing
report. The effect of the Probation Report may well be long-lasting and must be carefully
scrutinized by counsel as it is often relied upon by parole boards in determining when the
defendant should be released from prison. See Dickey, The Lawyer and the Accuracy of the
Pre-sentence Report, 43 FED. PROBATION 28, 33 (June 1979). Additionally, it will often prove
wise for defense counsel to prepare his own pre-sentence report as the probation officer may be
unsympathetic or overworked which may result in his placing undue reliance on police depart-
ment records and the prosecutor's summary report. The request that family and job sources
report to the probation office may be a difficult one to meet, whereas the attorney, himself, can
go and seek out helpful parties. Such counsel-prepared pre-sentence reports are becoming
increasingly accepted. See, e.g., NEW YORK CRIM. PROC. LAW 390.40 (McKinney 1971)
(specifically permitting such memoranda).
263. Comment, Adequacy of Criminal Defense Lawyers' Preparation for Sentencing, 1981
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 585.
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report.26 The same caseload pressures on the defender which inhibit
effective investigations, case preparation, and consultations with the cli-
ent, also inhibit counsel from attempting that which, albeit time-consum-
ing, may be of great help to their clients at the time of sentencing.265
VIII. The Impact of the Underfunding of Defender Offices on
the Adversary System
The underlying premise of our justice system's reliance on the ad-
versary system is the expectation that an effective, diligent counsel will
present to the courts the most impressive statement of facts, testimony of
witnesses, and analysis of precedent in support of his client's position. If
either side is so disadvantaged, underfunded, or overburdened that it
cannot function in this expected manner, then the adversarial process has
failed. 2 "
On a per capita basis, indigent defense spending nationwide repre-
sents less than three percent of all justice spending.267 The prosecution
receives almost four times the amount of funds spent by state and local
governments on indigent defense.268 Additionally, monies spent on the
preparation of the prosecutor's case, which are officially classified as po-
lice expenditures and not counted as part of the prosecutor's budget (e.g.,
police laboratory analyses, police chemists testifying as expert witnesses,
264. Id. at 611-18.
265. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, ASSESSMENT OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES IN JACKSON COUNTY, OREGON (1978), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note
76, at Appendix F-42 (the "assembly-line justice" found to exist results in rapid pleas and
inadequate preparation particularly for sentencing hearings); NATIONAL CENTER FOR DE-
FENSE MANAGEMENT, SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STUDY OF INDIGENT DEFENSE DELIVERY
SYSTEMS FOR STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA (1977), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76, at
Appendix F-51 (defenders do little to effectively prepare for sentencing and fail to pursue
alternative sentencing arrangements).
266. See THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON POVERTY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (1963) (insofar as the financial
status of the accused impedes vigorous and proper challenges, there is a threat to the viability
of the adversarial system).
267. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPE-
CIAL REPORT, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS 7 (1984).
268. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1980
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 11 (1981). The disparity between the fund-
ing of prosecutor and defender offices is illustrated by the statement of the Public Defender for
Montgomery County, Maryland, upon his resignation:
I guess that one of my major reasons for leaving the public defender's office and
entering private practice was to get away from all the frustration. We're really hurt-
ing. When the prosecutor's office asks for money to increase their efficiency, the
purse strings open wide. When we ask for money everything closes shut.
Public Defenders: Small Staffs, Heavy Caseloads Plague Lawyers for the Poor, Washington
Post, Sept. 6, 1979, at 1, col. I.
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and police investigators assigned to prosecutors' offices) can overwhelm
the defense's resources. 269 Yet, some believe it inadvisable for public de-
fenders to receive funds equal to those of their adversaries. After ac-
knowledging the inequality in funding, the President of Harvard
University, in his analysis of the state of the legal profession, commented:
[I]f Congress provided enough funds for legal aid, or if it agreed to
offer the same support to legal defenders as it gives the prosecution,
it could easily touch off a burst of litigation that would cost huge
sums of money and add heavily to the burdens and delays of the
legal system.27°
If one expects the confrontation between adversaries to lead to a
reliable determination by the factfinder, each side must be relatively bal-
anced in assets, time, and assistance. Moreover, when those required to
refute a serious accusation are denied the tools of the contest, their confi-
dence in the fairness and equity of the result diminishes.2 7 1
IX. The Providers of Defense Services Respond to Inadequate
Funding: Two Examples
A. The Zone Defense
Public Defender offices may respond to inadequate financing and the
resultant insufficient staffing by instituting sequential, or stage represen-
tation, which is also referred to as horizontal representation or the "zone
defense." The defendant encounters a new attorney at every stage of his
case since the attorneys are assigned to courtrooms, not to clients. Such
representation is economical for the office since, for example, the attor-
ney who is assigned to the court part for arraignments handles all the
cases for that day in that part, whereas another lawyer may be in the
269. The Public Defender of Prince Georges County, Maryland, stated in regard to his staff
of ten defenders: "To be on par with the prosecutor's staff, we'd have to have 21 attorneys....
Then, too their office gets support from the local police, the FBI, crime labs and all other kinds
of state, local and federal agencies. How do you play catch up against a team like that?" Id.
The President of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys in New York City has written of the
conditions facing defense attorneys in Brooklyn, New York: "An attorney functioning under
these conditions is in no position to oppose the will of the state effectively; rather than being an
effective adversary to the state, he is another cog in 'the system that isn't working.'" Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Association of Legal Aid Attorneys, at 13, in Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1973).
270. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. OF LEGAL EDUCATION,
570, 575 (1983) (citation omitted).
271. See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 413 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976)
(failure to provide effective assistance is a fundamental constitutional error that undermines
the entire adversary process); Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1970) (our
adversary system cannot serve its function unless the accused's counsel conducts the required
investigation and presents an intelligent and knowledgeable defense).
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motion part and handle all the motions for that day for every client the
office represents.
The client, however, never feels he has "a lawyer" because his law-
yer always changes. Moreover, the quality of representation certainly
suffers because no lawyer takes full responsibility for planning a defense,
time is lost in contacting witnesses, and communication between a client
and his attorney are impeded.272 The assembly-line mentality that re-
sults diminishes job satisfaction and aggravates the problems of turnover
and loss of experienced attorneys.273
A federal district court, while reversing a defendant's conviction on
ineffective representation grounds, noted the saga of that individual lost
in the maze of sequential representation:
[P]etitioner was assigned Legal Aid counsel and an attorney named
Richter, whom he never saw again, spoke to him hurriedly on that
occasion. Petitioner was remanded then, and has been locked up
ever since.
From the morning of October 18 until December 15, no lawyer
came to speak to petitioner about his plight. He was indicted on
November 1.... Thereafter, he came to court several times to hear
that his case was being postponed, evidently "represented" for
these purposes by a series of Legal Aid attorneys, but never having
an opportunity to consult with any of them.
On March 11, 1968, a Legal Aid attorney, whose name we do
not know, handled a calendar call of petitioner's case and told him
that a new staff attorney, William Harrison, had been assigned to
272. A description of the way this system works in one county in Maryland clearly illus-
trates the problems that result:
[T1he procedural material for providing representation is a "duty-day" system. Nor-
mally, this means that the lawyer does not know prior to coming to court the cases
that he or she will represent. Typically, the cases on the court docket are of two
types: new cases that have not previously been in court, and old cases that have been
in court earlier and were continued until the lawyer's duty day. Since frequently
there is no advance communication with clients, duty-day lawyers often represent
defendants with virtually no preparation. As one public defender explained, there is
no opportunity to investigate, plan strategy, or subpoena witnesses.
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, DEFENSE SERV-
ICES IN PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND (1980), reported in LEFSTEIN, supra note 76,
at 46. See also Gilboy & Schmidt, Replacing Lawyers: A Case Study of the Sequential Repre-
sentation of Criminal Defendants, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-2 (1979) (the stage
representation given indigents by the Chicago Public Defenders Office resulted in inadequate
case preparation, lost opportunities to contact witnesses, and gaps in legal representation leav-
ing the defendant without assistance of counsel at critical stages of the case).
273. See Platt & Pollock, Channeling Lawyers: The Careers of Public Defenders, 9 IssuES
IN CRIMINOLOGY 1, 26-27 (1974) (the fragmentation resulting from handling only one stage of
a criminal case may lead to public defenders perceiving their work as meaningless since they
have no overall view of the system); KRANTZ & SMITH, supra note 193, at 220 (lawyers who
function in stage representation system may have lower morale as a result); see also, LEFSTEIN,
supra note 76, at F-48.
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represent him. According to the pertinent court record, peti-
tioner's case was marked "ready" for trial at the time of that
March 11 call, but neither Mr. Harrison nor anyone else even sup-
posedly knowledgeable was present to handle the matter, and an-
other of many adjournments was ordered.
Still unaware of what, if anything, was being done for him,
petitioner drafted a paper for move of relief of the Legal Aid Soci-
ety and assignment of different counsel. He wrote: "I have been
locked up for five months and each time I come back to court I
have another lawyer handling my case." At the cursory oral hear-
ing of his motion on March 22, 1968, asked why he was dissatisfied,
petitioner said: "It seems to me that they are not interested at
a1.
, 274
The defender who must stay all day, day after day, in the same
courtroom, is not likely to risk antagonizing the judge or the prosecutor
in the name of zealous representation of his client.2 75 The desire for
pleasant, amiable working conditions may well lead the defender to act in
harmony with his fellow "employees. "276 One study of the Public De-
fender office in Denver found certain defenders to be so compatible with
the judges of the court to which they were assigned that the relationship
was termed a "marriage. '
The National Study Commission on Defense Services in 1976 con-
demned sequential representation and Standard 5.11 of the Guidelines
for Legal Defense Systems called for continuity of representation by one
274. United States ex rel. Thomas v. Zelker, 332 F. Supp. 595, 596-98. (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Fourteen years later, lack of continuous representation was an apparent cause for an individual
to spend three months in jail for a crime he was not charged with. A man named Willie Jones,
who was, however, not the Willie Jones in a pending prosecution in the Manhattan Supreme
Court, informed a succession of Legal Aid Society lawyers appearing to represent him that he
was not the right defendant. The lawyers, refusing to believe the protests, merely offered Mr.
Jones the prosecutor's plea bargain for a reduced sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. The
error was discovered only on the day of trial when the lawyer appearing was the same lawyer
who had represented the proper Willie Jones upon his arraignment, and realized that the
wrong man was about to be tried. The Wrong Willie Jones Spends Three Months in Jail, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
275. For example, the defender may quite legitimately believe that the interests of future
clients might well be harmed if he persists in pursuing, for one defendant, a claim that the
judge consideres to be unworthy and ill-advised.
276. A comment by a public defender in Chicago illustrates the atmosphere that can de-
velop: "It's our court .... It's like a family. Me, the prosecutor, the judges, we're all friends.
I drink with the prosecutors. I give the judge a Christmas present, he gives me a present."
Goldman & Holt, How Justice Works: The People vs. Donald Payne, Newsweek, March 8,
1971, at 29.
277. Note, Comparison of Public Defenders' and Private Attorneys' Relationship with the
Prosecution in the City of Denver, 50 DEN. L. J. 101, 109 (1973).
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lawyer of a client's case from arraignment through sentencing.278 The
defender's sense of accountability and authority is diminished when he
only represents his client for one aspect of the criminal process.
2 79
B. The Contract System
As state and county governments have cut back in recent years in
funding for indigent defense services, a new form of delivery of defense
services, the contract system, has rapidly emerged.28 ° In the most typical
form of contract system, the county contracts out the representation of
indigent defendants to whatever group of lawyers bids the lowest, a pro-
cedure not unlike that commonly utilized for awarding contracts for the
building of roads and sewers.281 The attorneys selected, offering to ac-
cept a small overall fee for handling a large volume of cases, are often
unable to provide even a semblance of the constitutionally mandated
quality of representation.28 2 The contract period is generally only for
278. NLADA, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES,
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1976) [hereinafter cited
as NLADA REPORT]. Standard 5.11 reads in part:
Defender offices should provide for continuous and uninterrupted representation of
eligible clients from initial appearance through sentencing up to, but not including,
the appellate and post-conviction stages by the same individual attorney. Defender
offices should urge changes in court structure and administration to reduce fragmen-
tation and to facilitate continuous representation.
See also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, Standard 5-5.2, which similarly
calls for continuity of representation. The Commentary to that standard characterizes the
disadvantages of the zone defense, "particularly in human terms," as substantial.
279. For further analysis of the inadequacies of the zone defense, see NLADA REPORT,
supra note 278 at 462-470; see also Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 272.
280. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPE-
CIAL REPORT, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS 4 (1984). See also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (1985) (contracts for defense services
represent the largest percentage growth in defense services over the past decade); Elbowing Out
Public Defenders, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 1, col. I (the contract system is the fastest
growing form of indigent defense system in the country today).
281. In May, 1981, six lawyers boasted to the government of Greenville, South Carolina
that they could save the county $150,000 by taking over the caseload of the Public Defender
Office. The Greenville County Bar Association, by an overwhelming 100-4 vote, expressed
their reservations about the plan, but after only a few weeks of consideration, the County
decided to dismantle the Public Defender Office and sign up the private contractors. Elbowing
out Public Defenders, supra note 280.
282. See generally, R.J. Wilson, Contract-Bid Programs: A Threat to Quality Indigent
Defense Services (1982) (unpublished report for the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion); see also GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 186 (the implementation of contract systems by
county officials confronted with shrinking budgets has led to serious abuses); LEFSTEIN, supra
note 76, at 51 (the replacement in 1981 in Vancouver, Washington, of a public defender system
by a contract system in order to save funds led to a decrease in the quality and zeal of the
representation provided); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS 8 (1984) (counties with the
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one year,2 83 and are usually lump-sum or fixed-fee agreements, which
may actually institutionalize disincentives for quality representation. 4
Any money spent by the attorneys on, for example, investigators or ex-
pert witness consultation comes from the attorneys' own profits from the
contract. Hence, low expenditures on investigation mean more money
for the lawyers. The lawyer has the incentive to dispose of the case as
quickly as possible rather than to take the case to trial and spend a lot of
time when no greater payment will result.28
The organized bar has attempted, often without success, to prevent
local governments from continuing to expand the contract system. The
Seattle-King County Bar Association Task force reported: "The Task
Force believes that the fundamental constitutional right to appointed
counsel for the indigent accused is threatened in King County by the
current practice of awarding contracts for public defense services based
primarily on a fixed fee per case, without consideration of clearly ex-
pressed criteria of quality." ' 6
A report of the State Bar of California warned that whatever money
a county might intially save by contracting for defense services, may be
less than the expenses the county might incur by having to defend itself
contract system fell sharply behind all other counties in insuring the early appointment of
counsel, only 12% of contract counties provided counsel within twenty-four hours of the de-
fendant's arrest).
283. Spangenburg, Davis & Smith, Contract Defense Systems Under Attack: Balancing
Cost and Quality, NLADA BRIEFCA§E 12, 17 (1982).
284. See WASHINGTON STATE BIR ASSOCIATION, METHODS OF PROVIDING REPRESEN-
TATION FOR THE INDIGENT CRIMIN'L ACCUSED 15 (1975), cited in State v. McKenny, 582
P.2d 573, 577 (Wash. 1978) (when the pompensation paid to an attorney is not at all related to
the amount of work done, there is "an economic disincentive against satisfactory representa-
tion of the accused.").
285. An examination of the contract system in one county in Arizona reveals the dangers
inherent in such a system. In Arizona v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984), the Arizona
Supreme Court, while considering an appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, decided
to expand the record to examine the county's utilization of the contract system. Attorneys had
submitted bids to the County Board of Supervisors, to represent indigent defendants. No in-
formation was obtained as to the background, experience, or capabilities of any of the attor-
neys. In 1982-83, the County chose the four lowest bids, each award providing for one-fourth
of the total caseload. The lawyer for the defendant Smith had represented 149 felonies, 160
misdemeanors, 21 juvenile cases, and 33 miscellaneous criminal cases in that year, all of which
constituted only a part-time practice for the lawyer who had a private civil practice as well.
The Supreme Court of Arizona found that caseload "excessive, if not crushing", id. at 1380,
noting that "an attorney so overburdened cannot adequately represent all his clients properly
and be reasonably effective." Id. at 1381. The court concluded that "[w]e [a unanimous court]
believe that the system for obtaining indigent defense counsel in Mohave County militates
against adequate assistance of counsel for indigent defendants." Id.
286. SEATTLE-KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES TASK
FORCE, GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION OF DEFENDER AGENCIES, FINAL REPORT 1 (July
15, 1982) (emphasis added).
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against civil lawsuits for disregarding issues of professional compe-
tence.28 7 The county would also have to pay the cost of retrying defend-
ants whose convictions are reversed because of ineffective assistance.
The House of Delegates of the ABA, attempting to insure that counties
do not contract out defense services based solely on cost factors, ap-
proved a resolution concerning the contract system at each of its two
general meetings in 1985.28
X. The Obligation of the Bar to Respond: Two Proposals
When the government, through inadequate funding, has permitted a
system to exist in which public defenders are unable to comply with pro-
fessional guidelines for competent representation, the organized bar must
act to rectify the situation." 9 The legal profession has an obligation to
insure that the system providing representation for indigent defendants
complies with professional standards of competency, and with the consti-
tutional requirements of effective assistance of counsel and equal justice
under the law. The very first Ethical Consideration of the Code, EC 1-1,
informs the legal profession that "maintaining the integrity and improv-
ing the competence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical
responsibility of every lawyer.
' 290
The profession has a self-interest in improving representation of in-
digents. Because of the working conditions prevailing in most defender
offices, many attorneys stay there for a limited number of years. In their
present state, most defender offices fail miserably as training grounds for
287. SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACT DEFENSE SERVICES, STANDING COMMITTEE ON
THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, STATE BAR OF CALIFOR-
NIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTRACT DEFENSE SERVICES 2 (1981).
288. In the Resolution approved in February, 1985, the ABA resolved that it "opposes the
awarding of public defense contracts on the basis of cost alone, or through competitive bidding
without reference to quality of representation." And the August, 1985, resolution urged that
any contract entered into comply with both the NLADA's Guidelines for Negotiating and
Awarding Governmental Contracts for Criminal Defense Services, and Chapter 5 (Providing
Defense Services) of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. ANNUAL SUMMARY OF AC-
TION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORTS OF SECTIONS 17 (1985).
289. The Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1217 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Report on Professional Responsibility], noted the special obli-
gation of the profession with respect to legal reform, and added that:
When the lawyer fails to interest himself in the improvement of the law, the reason
does not ordinarily lie in a lack of perception. It lies rather in a desire to retain a
comfortable fit of accustomed way, in a distaste for stirring up controversy within the
profession, or perhaps in a hope that if enough time is allowed to pass, the need for
change will become so obvious that no special effort will be required to accomplish it.
Moreover, the Report warned that "where change must be thrust from without upon an un-
willing Bar, the public's least flattering picture of the lawyer seems confirmed." Id.
290. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44.
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young attorneys. By insuring proper funding and consequently proper
staffing, the profession can strengthen the training provided trial attor-
neys. The 1981 ALI-ABA Houston Conference on Lawyer Competence
emphasized the importance of an attorney's "transition education":
We are well aware that the early transition years of practice are a
time of great importance. They are formative years for learning
practice standards, developing a style and working for clients.
Transition education refers to this especially vulnerable and crucial
time in the early career of a lawyer when the profession can make
an important impact upon practice quality.291
The profession cannot condone training lawyers to learn that clients'
needs can be short-circuited or that comprehensive preparation is not
routinely expected or warranted. The profession can best impact upon
the "practice standards" of defender offices by acting to insure that there
is adequate funding for proper staffing of the offices.
It is also in the self-interest of lawyers to improve defender compe-
tence because the gross neglect and incompetence prevailing in the repre-
sentation of indigents degrades and insults the entire profession.
Maintaining public confidence in our criminal courts requires not only
that justice be done, but that it appears that the system is just and fair.29 2
For the profession to continue to accept and tolerate the public de-
fender's rushed, superficial, and often inadequate level of representation,
is to promote disrespect for all lawyers and to thwart the fair and effec-
tive administration of justice.293
291. ALI-ABA, COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, THE REPORT
OF THE HOUSTON CONFERENCE: ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS 23 (1981).
The need for training inexperienced lawyers in the skills of representing clients is illustrated by
the results of a Law School Admissions Council survey indicating that law schools were not
providing such training: 79.7% of the 1600 lawyers responding felt that law school had not
prepared them to interview clients, 57.9% indicated they were unprepared to conduct fact
investigations, 68.6%'believed law school had not prepared them to counsel clients, and 77.3%
indicated lack of training to prepare them to conduct negotiations. Baird, A Survey of the
Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264, 267-73 (1978).
See also LAW SCHOOLS AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 41-50 (1980).
292. See Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291, 1292 ("The role
of the advocate is, in important measure, to build trust in the fairness of the system. To inspire
trust, the advocate must not only be vigorous, but he must also seem so. Thus we are as
concerned with the appearance of zeal as with its reality.").
293. At least one long-time observor of the criminal justice system has maintained that the
increased respect for the system that would result from a higher quality defender system,
would lead to less crime. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 302
(1978) ("Nothing would contribute more to respect for law-and indirectly, thereby, to a re-
duction in crime-than to provide defendants with the 'effective assistance of counsel' guaran-
teed them by the Constitution.").
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The Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility
observed that "in the public mind, the whole administration of justice
tends to be symbolized by its most dramatic branch, the criminal law."' 94
The public, therefore, regards the trial lawyer, the most obvious repre-
sentative of the bar, as typical of the entire profession. Hence, the public
may well attribute the failings of the defender to the profession at
large.
295
The low status of the criminal defense lawyer has long been a con-
cern to the profession,296 yet calls to elevate the image of the poorly
respected and financially unattractive position297 have gone largely un-
heeded. Lawyers concerned with the standing of their profession ought
to realize that some financial self-sacrifice on their part may be needed to
elevate the public defender system because it is unrealistic to expect any
further infusion of public funds. The profession must not continue to
countenance violations of its own standards and wink in acceptance as
defenders fail to conduct needed investigations, speak to witnesses, com-
municate with their clients, and prepare a proper defense.
A. Lawyers' Registration Fees as a Source for Additional Funding
The problem of incompetent representation caused by too few de-
fenders carrying excessive caseloads would be ameliorated if the Code
provision of EC 2-25 were followed: "Every lawyer, regardless of profes-
294. Report on Professional Responsibility, supra note 289, at 1218.
295. The REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPE-
TENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979), prepared by the ABA Section on Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar, indicated that the entire profession would gain if trial
lawyers were to act more competently and professionally:
Public discussion of this issue [lawyer competency] has focused almost exclusively on
lawyer performance in the courtroom, there are two reasons why that criticism logi-
cally translates into a general concern with lawyer performance. The first is simply
that in terms of lay perception the trial lawyer is identified with the lawyers gener-
ally. More importantly, however, there is good reason to expect that, if too many
lawyers perform inadequately in the courtroom, the same is true of the many other
settings in which lawyers serve (or disserve) their clients. A lawyer's performance at
trial is merely more conspicuous, taking place in front of experienced observers-
judges, other lawyers, and members of the public.
Id. at 8.
296. See, e.g., Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The
Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B FOUND. RESEARCH J. 155, 166-67 (lawyers were asked to
rank legal specialties as to general level of prestige: criminal defense ranked twenty-third out
of thirty); Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 52, at 20 (providing defense services to the
poor is a non-prestigious activity); Watson, On the Low Status of the Criminal Bar: Psychologi-
cal Contributions of the Law School, 43 TEX. L. REV. 289, 291 (1965).
297. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON LEGAL MANPOWER NEEDS OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW, ARLIE HOUSE, VIRGINIA (1966), reprinted in 41 F.R.D. 389, 411 (1966) ("Every
effort should be made to elevate the status of the defense lawyer, in the eyes of the bar and in
the eyes of the public generally.").
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sional prominence or professional workload, should find time to partici-
pate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal services to
those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each
lawyer... ."29' The vast majority of lawyers, however, do not give a
significant amount of time to representing the poor.299 And in recent
years, the amount of pro bono work that had been occurring in the me-
dium to large size firms has been cut back.3"°
EC 2-29 also imposes a moral duty on the profession to provide
representation to the poor. EC 2-29 informs lawyers that if either a bar
association or a court requests them to represent an indigent, the lawyer
should not refuse to undertake the representation except for compelling
reasons.30 1 The Supreme Court established this duty in Powell v. Ala-
bama: "Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render ser-
vice when required by such an appointment. ' 3 2 A refusal of the court's
298. The ideals of the Code were elevated to the rank of duties when the ABA House of
Delegates in 1975 passed a resolution declaring that "it is a basic professional responsibility of
each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal services ...." (re-
printed in ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD A MANDATORY
CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PRACTICE OF EVERY LAWYER 26 (1979)). See Report on
Professional Responsibility, supra note 289, for an historical perspective of the public service
obligation; see also W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (3d ed. 1923) (from
the fifteenth century in England, a "serjeant-at-law" could be required by the court to repre-
sent a poor person).
299. The Private Bar Involvement Project of the ABA estimates that 12.2% of all attor-
neys participate in either a "compensated" (reduced charge) or free pro bono program provid-
ing legal services to the poor. ABA, 1985 DIRECTORY OF THE PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT
PROGRAM 198, Table 7. The former director of the ABA's project to assist pro bono publico
plans has observed: "In the final analysis, only a handful of exceptional attorneys are attempt-
ing to meet the vast legal needs of the public and to atone for the general failure of the bar to
serve the non-rich public." Tucker, Pro Bono ABA?, cited in R. NADER & M. GREEN, VER-
DICTS ON LAWYERS 26, 26-27 (1976); see also Lochner, The No Fee and Low Fee Practice of
Private Attorneys, 9 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 431 (concluding that most lawyers take such cases
for the purposes of gaining experience and attracting new clients, and that the work is done for
the middle class and not the poor).
300. For a discussion of the pressures on these firms that have resulted in their diminishing
commitments to pro bono work, see Phillips, Financing the Right to Counsel: A View from the
Private Bar, 19 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 375, 379 (1985).
301. The Code does not specify what would constitute a compelling reason, but EC 2-27
gives examples of what would not:
Compelling reasons do not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject
matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case, the
belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty, or the belief
of the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 45, Rule 6.2 ("A law-
yer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good
cause ... ").
302. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Courts have interpreted Powell to mean that the lawyer is




request may constitute contempt. 3  Other courts have held that per-
forming free services to indigents is a duty incident to the privilege of
practicing law.3° In fact, many states include as part of the oath for
admission to the Bar, a pledge similar to that required by Arkansas: "I
will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of
the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or mal-
ice. ' '3 15 It seems preferable, however, to avoid conscripting those unfa-
miliar with criminal defense work and undesirous of representing
indigent defendants, and to rely instead on an expanded defender system
with full-time expert attorneys.
The Comment to Model Rule 6.1 also states that each lawyer should
participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to indi-
gents.30 6 The time may well have come to mandate bar support in the
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the
traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one of these tradi-
tions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for
little or no compensation upon court order. Thus, the lawyer has consented to and
assumed this obligation, and when he is called upon to fulfill it he cannot contend
that it is "taking of his services."
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
See also State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 21 A.L.R.3d 804 (1966) (the lawyer owes a
duty to the court to represent indigents, and is obliged to answer the court's call).
303. State v. Frankel, 119 N.J. Super. 579, 293 A.2d 196 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973).
304. See, eg., Vise v. County of Hamilton, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857); see also Ex parte Dibble
(Hamaas v. State), 310 S.E.2d 440, 441 (S.C. App. 1983) ("[A] lawyer, by accepting a license
to practice law ... assumes the obligation of representing, without pay, indigent defendants in
criminal cases.").
305. Other states' oaths containing the identical or similar language include Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Florida, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin. The language of this oath was first adopted in the state of Washington over one
century ago and is still required by statute (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.48.210 (1961)) and
Rule (WASH. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE, Rule 5(G) (1965)). The American Bar
Association adopted the language in its recommended lawyer's oath in 1908 (33 RULES OF
THE ABA 584 (1908)). The oath was relied upon by the Arkansas Supreme Court in holding
that even though the maximum payment to assigned counsel of $350 per criminal case was
inadequate, it was constitutional because the oath taken by all lawyers requires representation
given free of any charge if needed. State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980). See
also Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 920 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 n.6 (1976),
where the court relied on § 6068(h) of the CAL. Bus. & PROF. C. provision that a lawyer
should not reject the "cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" to indicate that there is an
ethical obligation to serve without compensation.
306. The Kutak Commission which drafted the Model Rules first recommended a specific
requirement of pro bono service of "forty hours per year ... or the [financial] equivalent
thereof." See Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735, 736
n.5 (1980). A requirement was imposed on the lawyer to "make an annual report concerning
such service to appropriate regulatory authority." Id. at 736 n.6. There was widespread criti-
cism of the reporting requirement by the bar. See, eg., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAW-
YERS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE CONCERNING THE
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form of requiring all lawyers licensed to practice in a given state to pay
an annual fee to be used to hire additional lawyers to represent indigent
defendants. The mechanism for the collection of fees from practicing
lawyers is already in place. Every state now requires that lawyers ac-
tively practicing in that state pay an annual or biennial registration fee or
dues.3°7 The amount of the fee ranges from $25 to $300 per
year.30 8 Presently, these funds are used by the states primarily to finance
disciplinary agencies which investigate client complaints against lawyers.
They are also used for client security funds,30 9 unauthorized practice of
law public protection programs, continuing legal education programs, fee
arbitrations, and the increase of general funds in the state treasuries.3 10
An Agency for the Defense of the Indigent Accused, directed by
appointees of the state bar association, could determine the amount
JANUARY, 1980 DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 35
(1980) (terming the requirement "objectionable"). In June, 1980, the Commission voted to
delete the reporting requirement. Commission Votes Down Pro Bono Reporting, 66 A.B.A. J.
951 (1980). In December, 1980, Kutak announced that the Committee had amended the pro-
posed rule so as to provide an ethical duty instead of a mandatory obligation, acknowledging
that "the time for mandatory pro bono hasn't come." Slonin, Kutak Panel Report: No
Mandatory Pro Bono, 67 A.B.A. J. 33 (1981).
307. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS Chart 11 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as ABA SURVEY]. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), where the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the requirement that all lawyers practicing in a state pay
dues to be a member of the State Bar.Some counties impose additional requirements. For
example, El Paso County, Texas, requires that lawyers as a precondition of practicing law,
take two divorce cases per year, without charge. In 1982 a court order was issued to support
the county bar association's resolution; certain attorneys (e.g., prosecutors and law clerks)
were exempted. See In re El Paso Bar Association Pro Bono Publico Program, Order of the
District Courts of El Paso County, Texas (Sept. 24, 1982), cited in Wilson, Legal Aid and
Professional Responsibility: An Unmet Need and a Failure of Duty, n.28 (1985) (unpublished
manuscript). All members of the Orange County (Florida) Bar Association must accept two
pro bono referrals each year or make a financial contribution of $250 to the Legal Aid Society.
However, membership in the Orange County Bar Association is voluntary. Marin-Rosa &
Stepter, Orange County--Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary Bar Association, 59 FLA. BJ. 21,
21-22 (Dec. 1985).
308. ABA SURVEY, supra note 307.
309. Client security funds are generally created to compensate individuals who have suf-
fered monetary losses because of lawyer dishonesty. Lawyers' malpractice insurance com-
monly excludes coverage for such dishonesty or fraud. See generally Wray, A New Way to
Serve our Clients: The Clients' Security Fund, 35 TEX. B. J. 1023 (1972).
310. For example, half of the lawyers' registration fee collected in New York State is de-
posited in the general fund of the state treasury. CLIENT'S SECURITY FUND OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 6. For decisions upholding the power of the state to
impose licensing fees on attorneys as a general revenue measure, see Sweeney v. Cannon, 23
A.D.2d 1, 258 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1965); Williams v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287
(1941); In re Johnson, 47 Cal. App. 465, 190 P. 852 (1920).
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needed to subsidize defender agencies in that state.311 Fees paid by law-
yers would be increased to effectively subsidize the program.3 12 Those
states which presently use the fees to add to the general state treasuries,
could specifically designate those funds for defense of the indigent.
Those opposing the imposition of such a fee may argue that the
states would then cut their own financing of legal services and utilize the
lawyers' fees to continue overall funding at the same level. Leaders of
the bar associations in each state must act to insure that public funding
would continue at least at the same level, and that the lawyers' fees be
applied exclusively to increase funding for defender offices.313
Lawyers may complain that responsibility for providing effective
assistance ought to be shared by all taxpayers equally.314 Lawyers, how-
311. The Agency would need to conduct a thorough evaluation of the delivery of defense
services in that state. The assessments undertaken by the National Center for Defense Man-
agement (see supra notes 192, 206, 209, 227, 234, 265), the ABA Standing Committee on
Legal Aid an Indigent Defendants (see supra notes 216, 257), and the National Defender Insti-
tute (see supra note 191) could be models. Furthermore, the work of the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, commissioned by the Ohio Public Defender Commission to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of defender programs throughout the state (see supra note 189, 255), might
also be especially valuable.
312. Some states may have raised more income than required by the designated purposes of
the funds, and therefore little or no increase in fees would be required. For example, the
revenues raised in the three years ending December, 1984 which were allocated to the Client
Security Fund in New York exceeded $4,000,000, whereas the Fund disbursed only slightly
over $1,500,000 of those funds. CLIENT'S SECURITY FUND OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
1984 ANNUAL REPORT 6-7.
313. Specific details would be worked out at the state level. For example, it could be re-
quired that the percentage of the total criminal justice budget allocated to indigent defense
services remain at least at the level it had been prior to the institution of the lawyers' contribu-
tions, or that the percentage allocated to defense services remain at the same percentage of the
prosecutor's budget as had previously been the case. The Agency might choose to distribute
the funds directly to counties in proportion to the number of indigents charged with criminal
offenses. Alternatively, the Agency could require defender offices to submit proposals detailing
how the additional funds would be utilized. The Agency could then compare the actual office
caseload per attorney with the established national guidelines in assessing which offices had the
greatest need.
314. In fact, one segment of the private bar has been providing exceptional financial sup-
port. Lawyers representing indigents in federal court have been expected to do so at personal,
financial sacrifice. The fees allowable under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) do not and were
not intended to fully compensate a lawyer for his time and services. See United States v.
Hildebrandt, 420 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879,
887 (D.D.C. 1973). The legislative history of the CJA on the issue of lawyer compensation is
summarized in the following:
As reported by the subcommittee, H.R. 4816 provided for compensation to court-
appointed attorneys at a rate not to exceed $15 per hour for time reasonably spent,
and carefully accounted for, on behalf of an impoverished defendant. This amount
was conceded by virtually every witness at the hearings to be below normal levels of
compensation in legal practice. It was nevertheless widely supported as a reasonable
basis upon which lawyers could carry out their profession's responsibility to except
[sic] court appointments....
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ever, are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the delivery of
legal services and realize the need to insure constitutional and profes-
sional standards in the defense of all.315 The legal profession, having a
monopoly on the provision of legal services, has the burden to insure that
everyone whose liberty is at stake receives competent representation.
B. Utilization of Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts
An alternative source for additional funding may be monies from
Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA). Lawyers had tradition-
ally placed in aggregated, non-interest bearing accounts, those client
funds held in trust for future use which were either so small in amount or
expected to be held for such short duration that they could not be in-
vested productively on behalf of the client.316 Since the funds belonged
H.R. Rep. No. 846, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
2990, 2997-98.
Appointed counsel in state courts are also frequently undercompensated. See Lindh v.
O'Hara, 325 A.2d 84, 92 (Del. 1974) (reasonable compensation for appointed counsel is some-
where between a mere "honorarium" and the amount received by privately retained counsel);
People v. Johnson, 417 N.E.2d 1062 (Ill. App. Ct.), aff'd, 429 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1981) ("The
formula for reasonable compensation should be the hourly fee normally charged for compara-
ble [trial court] services, less an amount adequate to satisfy the pro bono factor."); State v.
Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983) (compensation need not equal that of retained counsel
and the lawyer's ethical obligation to provide counsel may be considered in the determination);
State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 412, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966) (payment ought to equal 60% of the
customary fee); Tappe v. Circuit Court, 326 N.W.2d 892 (S.D. 1982) (payment to appointed
counsel should be one-third below the prevailing rate received by retained counsel); State v.
Sidney, 66 Wis. 2d 602, 610, 225 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1975) (appointed counsel ought to receive
two-thirds the prevailing rate charged private clients for similar services). One state supreme
court has found that when funds allocated by the state to pay appointed counsel have been
expended, attorneys must continue to provide representation without expecting payment from
the state's general revenue. State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982). The Eighth Circuit upheld the ruling of the Missouri Supreme
Court, and concluded that: "Attorneys may constitutionally be compelled to represent indi-
gent defendants without compensation." Williamson v. Vardeman, 764 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th
Cir. 1982). But see Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981) (fee paid to appointed
counsel ought to equal that received by a lawyer representing a paying client).
315. A Report of the New York City Bar Association, considering the profession's pro
bono obligations, realized the special responsibilities of the profession:
We do not mean to suggest that the legal profession alone bears the responsibility for,
or has the resources adequate to satisfy, the needs for legal services and reform of
justice in our society. What we do assert is that every member of the profession, as a
professional and as an officer of the law, has a unique responsibility and opportunity
to make some contribution to the satisfaction of such needs.
THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD A MANDATORY CONTRIBU-
TION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER 9 (1979) (emphasis in original).
316. When the funds received are large in amount or to be held for a long period of time,
the funds are placed in interest-bearing accounts in the name of and for the benefit of the
client. It is, however, impractical to establish separate interest-bearing accounts for small or
short-term accounts.
to the clients until needed for the specific transaction, the lawyer was not
permitted to receive any interest on the funds. The banks in which the
money was deposited, therefore, had use of the funds without payment of
any interest.
When the federal funding available for the Legal Services Corpora-
tion was reduced in the early 1980's, appeals for local compensation for
the reductions led to the creation of IOLTA programs which pool attor-
ney trust accounts to generate interest income to subsidize civil legal
services programs.317 Since 1981, forty-one states and the District of Co-
lumbia have enacted IOLTA programs, 318 all but six providing for vol-
untary lawyer participation. 319 The Florida Supreme Court320 and a
federal District Court32 have upheld the constitutionality of Florida's
IOLTA plan, the first IOLTA plan in the nation.322 A California Court
of Appeal has unanimously upheld the constitutionality of its mandatory
program. 23 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility has concluded that lawyer participation in IOLTA pro-
grams is ethically permissible. 324 Although the concept of utilizing inter-
est on trust accounts is a new one in this country, foreign bar associations
have financed public interest projects since the 1960's with such interest
317. See, eg., Berg & Johnson, A Proposed New Revenue Source for Legal Services in Texas,
44 TEx. B. J. 57 (1983); Parker, Client Trust Accounts. A Funding Source for Legal Services,
54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 359 (1982). As of April 1, 1985, the seventeen operational IOLTA programs
reported interest income of over $27,737,000 of.which $13,158,000 was distributed to legal
services for the poor. National IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Update, Vol. 2, No. 4, at 11
(Spring 1985). One state, Maryland, instituted a new quasi-public corporation, Maryland
Legal Services Corporation, to administer the IOLTA program and allocate 100% of income
received to civil legal services programs. MD. ANN. CODE art X, § 44(a)(2) (1984 Cum.
Supp.)
318. National IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, No. 4, at 1 (Spring 1986).
319. IOLTA participation is mandatory for all attorneys in Arizona, California, Iowa,
Minnesota, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin. IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, No. 3, at 6-11 (Winter
1986). The start-up date for Wisconsin is January, 1987. IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, No. 4, at 7
(Spring 1986).
320. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978).
321. Cone v. Florida Bar, 626 F. Supp. 132 (M.D. Fla. 1985). This decision has been
appealed and is scheduled to be heard by the Eleventh Circuit in the fall of 1986.
322. The Florida plan became operational on September 1, 1981. It was followed by New
Hampshire on January 1, 1982, California on March 1, 1983, and Maryland on March 25, 1983.
See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY IOLTA TO BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 9 (1985).
323. Carroll v. State Bar, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 213 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1985), cert. denied
sub nom., Chapman v. State Bar of California, 106 S. Ct. 142 (1985). For a comprehensive
discussion of the constitutional issues involved, see Siegel, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account
Program: Do They "Take" Property of the Client?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 674 (1984).
324. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal Opinion No. 348 (1982).
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income.325
The Internal Revenue Service has approved the tax-exempt status of
an IOLTA plan, ruling that the interest earned was not income attributa-
ble to the client.326 It is necessary, however, for the state to set up a tax-
exempt charitable foundation to administer the plan since interest is tax-
able and the Internal Revenue Service does not regard state bar associa-
tions as public tax-exempt agencies.
327 The Federal Reserve System3 28
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 329 have authorized
IOLTA programs to receive interest payments from attorneys' deposits
of client trust funds.
As IOLTA funds first became available, states utilized the monies
for a variety of purposes, such as law student loans and scholarships,
community law-related education programs, establishment and mainte-
nance of lawyer referral systems, client security funds,330 and any other
program that the state's supreme court approved for the benefit of the
public. 33I Although no state currently utilizes IOLTA funds to subsidize
defender agencies, the use of IOLTA funds to aid in the defense of the
indigent accused of a crime clearly falls within the overall public interest
goals of the IOLTA programs.
325. ABA TASK FORCE AND ADVISORY BOARD ON INTEREST ON LAWYER TRUST Ac-
COUNTS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 3 (July 26, 1982). As of 1982, at least
twenty jurisdictions in five countries had IOLTA programs, and in Canada alone the annual
income totals about $34 million. Id. at 4. The statutes for use of IOLTA monies enacted in
the various provinces of Canada are almost identical with one another and mandate lawyers'
participation. Boone, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part I: An
Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries and Florida Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds Held
by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Organized Bar,
10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 546-47 (1979).
326. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16-17 (1981).
327. Rev. Rul. 77-232, 1977-2 C.B. 71 (1977).
328. Letter from the Gen. Couns., Fed. Reserve Sys. to the President of the Idaho Law
Found. (Jan. 28, 1983), reprinted in Interest on Law. Acc. Fund of the State of N. Y., IOLTA
44 (1985).
329. Letter from the Off. of the Gen. Couns., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. to the B. of Trustees
of the N. Y. S. Interest on Law. Acc. Fund (Aug. 8, 1984), reprinted id. at 43.
330. The initial purpose of the Florida Bar in attempting to use IOLTA funds was to de-
velop a revenue source for the clients' security fund, and it was not until 1977 that the Bar
sought to use the funds for other purposes. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799,
804 n.32 (Fla. 1978).
331. See National IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Update, Vol. 2, No. 3, at 10-12 (Winter
1985), for a listing of each state's approved use of IOLTA funds. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice had initially approved the use of funds for only four general categories: (1) to provide
legal aid to the poor; (2) to provide student loans; (3) to improve the administration of justice;
and (4) other programs approved from time to time by the state's supreme court for exclusively
public purposes. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1979). Over half the
states currently have catchall categories permitting funding for "projects which improve the
administration of justice." IOLTA Update, Vol. 4, no. 1, at 3 (Summer 1986).
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In all but five of the IOLTA plans, the state bar associations, with-
out the involvement of the legislatures, initiated the IOLTA plans and
petitioned the state supreme courts for the requisite court orders to im-
plement the plans which were typically administered by state bar founda-
tions.332 It is, therefore, the state bar, seeking approval of the supreme
court, which has the power to designate agencies providing representa-
tion for indigent defendants as recipients of the IOLTA funds. The five
states which passed legislation instituting IOLTA plans, however, would
need legislative amendment to incorporate defender offices as recipients
of interest income.333
The bar must realize the desperate state of the defender agencies,
and although states must provide counsel in criminal matters, public
funds provided are insufficient. 334 The judiciary, confronted daily with
inadequacies of representation resulting from insufficient funding, could
be expected to fully support additional funding for indigent defense.
Since there are no public funds involved in IOLTA plans (the banks
are the only ones incurring a financial loss when an IOLTA plan is
adopted),335 the resistance by taxpayers that may occur when there is the
direct expenditure of taxpayer monies for representation of indigent de-
fendants ought not occur. The states now providing for voluntary lawyer
participation in IOLTA plans could greatly increase the funds received
by making lawyer participation mandatory.336
332. The five states in which legislation was enacted for IOLTA are California, Connecti-
cut, Maryland, New York, and Ohio. IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, No. 3, at 6-11 (Winter 1986).
333. The legislation that created IOLTA in New York, for example, although entitled "In-
terest on Lawyer Accounts-Provisions of Legal Services to Poor," specifically excludes the
use of any IOLTA funds for assistance in any criminal proceeding. Act of July 25, 1983, ch.
659, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1279; see also MD. ANN. CODE art X, § 45 (J)(b)(2) (1984 Cum. Supp.).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 174-211.
335. There has been little opposition by banks to IOLTA plans, although the Florida State
Bankers did file a brief in opposition to the bar association petition in Florida. Parker, supra
note 315, at 361 n.1 1. Once the IOLTA structure is in place, the accounts remain profitable to
the banks. Interest is paid at the same level as all other NOW checking accounts. The opposi-
tion of the banks in the Australian state of Victoria did prevent establishment of an IOLTA
plan until 1964, when the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund (comparable to clients' security funds in
America) could no longer service all the claims and the Victoria parliament voted to institute a
plan. See Boone, supra note 325, at 543. Within a few years, revenues collected exceeded
demand of the Guarantee Fund and a Law Foundation was created to generally improve the
practice of law in Victoria. Id.
336. The mandatory program in California, for example, is currently bringing in over
$1,000,000 a month. National IOLTA Clearinghouse, IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, No. 3, at 3
(Winter 1986). There might, however, be some resistance by the state bar associations to re-
quiring lawyer participation. The Maryland State Bar Association Board of Governors in
November, 1985, rejected the unanimous recommendation of its own Special Committee on
IOLTA, which had recommended that lawyers' participation in the state's IOLTA program be
required. Id. at 4. The Section Council of the Delivery of Legal Services, and the Board of the
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The burden on the participating lawyer is minimal. The attorney
deposits the funds into an IOLTA interest-bearing bank account instead
of a non-interest-bearing account. The financial institution calculates the
interest and transfers it to the state bar foundation. It would be the re-
sponsibility of the Bar Foundation administering the plan to insure that
public funding of indigent defense continues at least at previous levels
and that the IOLTA funds designated for a specific defender agency be a
supplement to and not a replacement of state or county contributions.
337
Conclusion
The lack of adequate funding and the resulting excessive caseload
assigned to public defenders interfere with the defense counsel's ability to
effectively and competently represent their clients. Inadequate investiga-
tion of the facts and the law pertaining to a client's case, insufficient time
for counsel to communicate and consult with the defendant, and exces-
sive reliance on guilty pleas as an attempt by defenders to manage an
overwhelming caseload, threaten the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.
Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Services, Inc., also had unanimously recommended a mandatory
plan. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIrrEE ON MANDATORY IOLTA TO BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 3 (November 1985). Some states with
voluntary plans have been successful at achieving high rates of participation. The New Hamp-
shire Bar Association's Law Weekly carries an "Honor Role" listing all new IOLTA partici-
pants, and the state currently has a 48% participation rate from eligible attorneys, the highest
rate of all voluntary programs. IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, No. 3, at 3 (Winter 1986). One highly
successful county bar association in Colorado has produced a video entitled "Successful
IOLTA Recruiting" to assist other counties in their efforts. IOLTA Update, Vol. 4, no. I, at 5
(Summer 1986). The Maryland Legal Services Corporation conducted an intense campaign in
which every lawyer received at least two mailings and a telephone call to encourage participa-
tion. As a result, the enrollment rate of eligible attorneys as of November, 1985, was 44.8%.
See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY IOLTA TO BOARD OF GovER-
NORS, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 8, 9 (November 1985). Florida, on the other
hand, has a participation rate of only 21%. Still-pending constitutional challenge (see supra
note 321), may well be a prime factor. See IOLTA Update, Vol. 3, no. 4, at 7 (Spring 1986).
However, New York, where there is no such challenge, has a participation level of only seven
percent. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1985, col. 3, at 1. Delaware, in 1983, began a unique Opt-Out
plan whereby it is assumed that all attorneys will be participating, but any attorney may
choose not to partake in the plan. See Supreme Court of Delaware, Order of September 23,
1983 Approving Amended Rule DR 9-102 of the Delaware Lawyers' Code of Professional
Responsibility. By 1985, 90% of all eligible attorneys were participating. IOLTA Update,
Vol. 3, No. 3, at 7 (Winter 1986). Two years after Delaware instituted its plan, the District of
Columbia and Rhode Island adopted similar Opt-Out arrangements. See District of Columbia
Court of Appeals Order No. M-155-85 (Feb. 22, 1985); Rhode Island Supreme Court Order
amending Rule 47 of the Supreme Court Rules (November 21, 1984).
337. See supra note 313.
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Local governments face financial pressures which threaten further
decreases in funds allocated for representation of the indigent. Conse-
quently, there may be increased reliance on systems which undermine the
effectiveness of counsel: the contract system and the "zone defense"."'
In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions make it more difficult for
defendants to successfully appeal their convictions based on ineffective
assistance grounds.339 If there is to be a "strong presumption" of attor-
ney competence, 34 that presumption must have some basis in fact. It
becomes, therefore, all the more necessary to insure that the defense
counsel provided at the trial level is not pressured by an overwhelming
workload to neglect the interests of his clients and fail to perform the
essential tasks of representation.
The legal profession as well as the state has the responsibility to
insure effective assistance of counsel. The bar must not ignore this crisis
of considerable and perhaps increasing proportions-the publicly fi-
nanced defender programs are not able to provide competent, effective
assistance of counsel. The right to counsel guaranteed by Gideon is
meaningless if the number of counsel that publicly financed defender pro-
grams can provide is insufficient to meet the needs of indigent defend-
ants. Ultimately, when, as a result of the underfinancing of defender
offices, counsel is ill-prepared and unable to pursue the defendant's cause
diligently and competently, the mandate of the Eighth Amendment is
redefined so as to require the mere presence, and not the assistance, of
counsel.
338. See discussion of problems created by the "zone defense" and the contract system
supra text accompanying notes 272-288.
339. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 97-143. The Court itself in a recent
case noted: "As is obvious, Strickland's standard, although by no means insurmountable, is
highly demanding." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 54 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4794 (1986).
340. See supra note 101.
Summer 19861 ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

